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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA TION REMEDIES
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers whether a successful employment discrimination
plaintiff may be entitled, under current law, to receive an augmented award
(a "gross up") to neutralize certain adverse federal income tax conse-
quences. The question of whether such a gross up is allowed, the resolution
of which can have drastic effects on litigants, has received almost no atten-
tion from practitioners, judges, or academics. Because of the potentially
enormous impact of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) on discrimination
lawsuit recoveries,' the gross-up issue is now beginning to appear in reported
2
cases.
The three principal federal anti-discrimination statutes-Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")-generally
confer broad equitable powers on the courts to devise remedies that will
make the victims of discrimination whole in economic terms. The Internal
Revenue Code ("Code"), however, sometimes operates to frustrate this
make-whole objective by taxing a discrimination award more heavily than it
would have taxed the components of the award had the plaintiff earned the
components in due course. This excess taxation gives rise to what this Article
calls "adverse tax consequences."
A discrimination plaintiff may suffer adverse tax consequences in two
distinct ways. First, the Code may subject amounts recovered to compensate
for back pay and front pay losses to higher income tax rates than if the
plaintiff had earned such amounts as wages in due course. This increase in
tax rates is typically due to the fact that the plaintiffs recovery is in a lump
sum; as a result, a portion of the recovery may be subject to marginal rates
higher than the plaintiffs typical marginal rate.
Second, an employment discrimination recovery could implicate the
AMT. If so, the AMT may cause the recovery to be effectively taxed at rates
1. See discussion ifra Part I.B (explaining the impact of the AMT on discrimination law-
suit recoveries).
2. See Porter v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 293 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C.
2003) (considering a tax gross up under Tide VII); cf. Ferrante v. Sciaretta, No. HNT L-584-02,
2003 NJ. Super. LEXIS 408, at *6 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 14, 2003) (considering a tax
gross up under New Jersey's Laws Against Discrimination); Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 87 P.3d 757, 759 (Wash. 2004) (considering a tax gross up
under the Washington Law Against Discrimination).
3. In very general terms, the AMT is an alternative tax system that was designed to ensure
that the very wealthy pay more than a minimal amount of income tax. See BORRIs I. BITTKER ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 45.01, at 45-1 to 45-4 (3d ed. 2002) (discuss-
ing the purpose of the AMT). If a taxpayer's AMT liability is greater than her regular tax liabil-
ity, then the taxpayer must pay the higher amount. I.R.C. § 55(a) (2000). The AMT as it cur-
rently exists is extremely flawed. See Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT: Projections and Problems,
100 TAX NOTES 105, 109 (2003). One problem with the AMT is the AMT trap for discrimination
plaintiffs described in this Article. In addition, unless the AMT is repealed or substantially re-
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significantly higher than the top marginal rate of 35%. In fact, in certain
cases, the AMT may cause the tax on the recovery to exceed 100%-
meaning that a victorious plaintiff would owe more in taxes than her recov-
ery.4 This "AMT trap" is notoriously absurd as a matter of tax policy5 and
"undermines the national policy of encouraging the pursuit of meritorious
civil rights claims."6 Yet, the trap persists, at least in most areas of the coun-
try.
The resolution of the gross-up issue depends ultimately on whether the
federal anti-discrimination remedial provisions permit judges to shift the li-
ability for these adverse tax consequences from the plaintiff-on whom the
Code specifically imposes the liability-to the defendant-whose unlawful
conduct necessitated the lawsuit that caused the adverse tax consequences.
The potential vehicle for this shift is the broad equitable powers conferred
upon courts to fashion relief in order to make victims of discrimination
whole.
The issue of whether these broad equitable powers allow judges to shift
a portion of the plaintiff's federal income tax liability to defendants is par-
ticularly interesting since both the plaintiffs tax liability and the defendant's
discrimination liability arise from federal statutes passed by Congress. Thus,
the resolution of the issue depends on which body of statutes, the Code or
the pertinent federal anti-discrimination statute, prevails over the other.
More generally, though, the issue concerns the courts' willingness to
delve into federal income tax matters in non-tax cases and focus on after-tax
dollars, which are meaningful, rather than pre-tax dollars, which are mean-
ingless." Courts typically have been reluctant to get their hands dirty with tax
law if they can avoid it. Determining after-tax income can be a painstaking
process and predicting future after-tax income even more so. Nevertheless,
formed, this tax will soon affect a huge number of ordinary taxpayers. See id. at 105-06 (project-
ing that by 2010 one-third of all taxpayers and 92% of households with income between
$100,000 and $500,000 will be subject to the AMT).
4. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 425-26 (2000) (Beghe,J, dissenting).
5. See RobertJ. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phaseouts and Floors in the Individual Income Tax
System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415, 1422-25 (2001) (criticizing the AMT trap on tax policy grounds);
Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney's Fee Arrangements:
Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REV. 57, 68-73 (2002) (same).
6. Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2000).
7. Due to a severe federal circuit split, the trap currently applies in some circuits but not
others. See infra Part I.B.3 (describing the circuit split). On March 29, 2004, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari with respect to the tax issue in two consolidated cases: Commissioner v. Ba-
naitis, 124 S. Ct. 1713 (2004) and Commissioner v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 1712 (2004). As a result, the.
circuit court split will be resolved. For a more in-depth discussion of the tax issue, see infra Part
I.B.
8. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980) (recognizing that "af-
ter-tax income, rather than one's gross income before taxes ... provides the only realistic
measure" of lost income).
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we conclude that courts have the authority to provide gross ups to discrimi-
nation plaintiffs and should exercise this authority whenever adverse tax
consequences are substantial.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the adverse tax con-
sequences that may impact plaintiffs suing under federal anti-discrimination
statutes. Part II discusses the few cases that have addressed the question of
whether these statutes allow gross ups. Part III makes the prima facie argu-
ment that courts have the authority to provide gross ups for adverse tax con-
sequences. Part IV sets forth and analyzes arguments against gross ups, but
ultimately concludes that these counter-arguments are not fully persuasive.
Finally, Part V considers the issue of gross ups in more complex discrimina-
tion lawsuits.
1. ADVERSE TAx CONSEQUENCES
Using Title VII as an example, an employment discrimination plaintiff
may recover damages for back pay and front pay losses resulting from the
defendant's conduct. 9 In addition, a plaintiff may recover amounts that do
not simply compensate the plaintiff for pecuniary losses. These non-
pecuniary components, which in general are limited to an aggregate amount
of no more than $300,000,"' fall into two distinct categories. "Compensatory"
damages are designed to compensate the plaintiff for emotional distress and
other non-pecuniary losses caused by the defendant's conduct," while "pu-
nitive" damages serve to punish the defendant in cases where it is shown that
the defendant acted with an ill motive.I2 In order to isolate the question of
whether a gross-up award is appropriate in general from the computational
issue of the proper amount of a gross up in complex cases, we start by dis-
cussing only the adverse tax consequences on pecuniary components (i.e.,
13back-pay and front-pay awards, as adjusted for the time value of money).
A back-pay award compensates the plaintiff for the amount of wages he
had lost prior to the judgment. 4 Since the wages, had they been earned by
the plaintiff in due course, could have been invested by the plaintiff, an in-
terest component is generally added to the back-pay award.' 5 On the other
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1) (2000).
10. Id. § 1981c(h)(3).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 1981A(b) (2). SeeKolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) (holding
that an award of punitive damages is appropriate under Title VII where an employer acts with
malice or reckless disregard of an employee's protected rights).
13. In Part V we address these computational issues in complex cases.
14. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-17 (1975) (discussing the equi-
table nature of the back-pay award).
15. This interest component is usually in the form of prejudgment interest. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (6th Cir. 1996) (awarding pre-judgment
interest and discussing its equitability). Courts also award post-judgment interest in appropriate
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hand, a front-pay award compensates the plaintiff for future wage loss. 16
Since the plaintiff receives the front-pay award in one lump sum (rather
than as wages periodically in the future), a court must discount the award to
reflect time value of money principles.'
7
The tax treatment of personal injury awards is relatively straightforward,
except in cases in which the AMT trap, discussed below in Part I.B, is impli-
cated. Unless the claim arises from a physical injury, a plaintiffs entire
award is taxed as ordinary income, subject to the tax rates specified in Code
§ .' With respect to pecuniary damages, this tax treatment appears consis-
tent with the tax treatment that would have been accorded the back pay and
front pay had the plaintiff earned them in due course. However, pecuniary
damages may in fact be taxed more heavily than the lost wages they repre-
sent. We refer to this excess taxation as an "adverse tax consequence."
To be precise, we use the term "adverse tax consequences" to refer to
the amount by which (i) the after-tax dollars recovered by a plaintiff (after
proper adjustment to take into account time value of money principles) for
pecuniary damages is less than (ii) the after-tax dollars the plaintiff (after
proper adjustment for time value of money) would have received had no
discrimination occurred and the plaintiff earned the wages represented by
the pecuniary damage award in due course. Therefore, for purposes of
computing the amount of adverse tax consequences, the baseline is simply
the amount of money the plaintiff would have had (after taxes) absent the
discrimination.
circumstances. See, e.g., Skalka v. Fernald Envd. Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 428-29
(6th Cir. 1999) (awarding post-judgment interest from the date of the initial judgment).
16. Susan K Grebeldinger, The Role of Workplace Hostility in Determining Prospective Remedies
for Employment Discrimination: A Cail for Greater Judicial Discretion in Awarding Front Pay, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 622 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the
district court's use of present value principles to discount the front-pay award); Cassino v.
Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing ajury's competence to
reduce a front-pay award to present value).
18. Cf I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2000) (excluding damages, other than punitive damages, from
gross income if such damages arise from a personal physical injury). This inconsistent tax
treatment between recoveries arising from a personal physical injury and recoveries arising from
a personal non-physical injury has been extensively criticized on a number of grounds. See, e.g.,
Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of Employment Discimination Dam-
ages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223, 227-29 (1998) (contending that the inconsistent
treatment creates race and gender biases); J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical:
Excluding Personal Injury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 168
(1997) (contending that the inconsistent treatment violates tax policy principles and creates
administrative hardships); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for
Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
447, 449-50 (1998) (criticizing the inconsistent treatment); Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age:
Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1348 (2000) (contending that
there are no policyjustifications for the inconsistent treatment).
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A variety of circumstances can give rise to adverse tax consequences. For
example, because of the so-called "marriage penalty," an award of back pay
to a married plaintiff who was single at the time the back wages would have
been earned may be subjected to a higher rate because of his new marital
status. 9 In addition, adverse tax consequences may arise when Congress
raises marginal tax rates. In such a case, the pecuniary damages will be taxed
at the higher new rates even though the back wages they represent would
have been taxed at the lower old rates.
Many other circumstances may cause the plaintiff to suffer adverse tax
consequences. Two are usually by far the most significant, however, and will
be the focus of this Article. First, because the pecuniary damages are paid in
one lump sum (rather than periodically), the result is a "bunching" of in-
come that, while earned over a period of time, is received and taxed in a
single tax year. This bunching may cause the damages to be taxed at a
higher rate than had the plaintiff received them in due course as wages. 2°
Similarly, the AMT trap may cause the damages to be effectively taxed at
21higher rates than had the plaintiff received them as wages.
Before addressing the bunching problem and the AMT trap in depth,
we should emphasize that the actual computation of the precise amount of
adverse tax consequences can be highly complex. We discuss some aspects of
this complexity in more detail below. 2' The purpose of this Article, however,
is not to demonstrate how to compute the precise amount of adverse tax
consequences.23 Rather, the purpose of this Article is to discuss the thresh-
old question of whether discrimination plaintiffs should be compensated
(i.e., grossed-up) for adverse tax consequences. Parts L.A and I.B below pro-
vide very simple, and thereby somewhat unrealistic, examples to explain the
two main causes of adverse tax consequences. Although simplistic, the ex-
amples serve their purpose-to show in general terms the two main Code
imperfections that are the primary source of adverse tax consequences.
19. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1429-
31 (1975) (discussing the marriage penalty); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a
Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1980) (same); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993) (same); MichaelJ. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family
in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1586 (1977) (same).
20. See infra Part L.A (discussing the bunching problem).
21. See infra Part .B (discussing the AMT trap).
22. See infra Part IV.C.
23. For discussions of the computational issues, see Barry Ben-Zion, Neutralizing the Adverse
Tax Consequences of a Lump-Sum Award in Employment Cases, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 233-44 (2000)
and Tyler J. Bowles & W. Cris Lewis, Taxation of Damage Awards: Current Laws and Implications,
LITIG. ECON. DIG., Fall 1996, at 73-77. These articles assume without discussion that tax gross
ups are permitted under federal anti-discrimination law.
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A. THE BUNCHING PROBLEM
Assume that from 1993 through 2002 an unmarried plaintiff earned
$40,000 per year in wages, had an amount of other income to offset exactly
his standard deduction and personal exemption deduction, and always took
the standard deduction. 24 In 2003, a court determines that, but for unlawful
discrimination, the plaintiff would have earned $65,000 per year, rather than
25$40,000, for the past ten years. In addition, the court determines that, even
though for the next four years (2003 through 2006) it is expected that the
plaintiff will continue to earn $40,000 per year in substitute employment,
the plaintiff would have earned $65,000 per year had the discrimination not
occurred. As a result, the court awards the plaintiff pecuniary damages of
$350,000 ($250,000 of back pay and $100,000 of front pay), and the defen-
dant pays that amount in one lump sum to the plaintiff in 2003.
Under the tax law, the plaintiff will include the entire $350,000 in gross
income in 2003 when he receives the money.26 This is so even though the
$350,000 represents an amount that the plaintiff earned (or with regard to
the front pay, would have earned) over a fourteen-year time period (from
1993 through 2006) .27
As a result, in 2003 the plaintiff will have taxable income equal to
$390,000, the sum of the $40,000 in regular wages and the $350,000 in pe-
cuniary damages. This $390,000 would be applied to the plaintiffs 2003 tax
rates. As a result, the first $7,000 would be taxed at 10%, the next $21,400 at
15%, the next $40,400 at 25%, the next $174,600 at 28%, the next $168,450
24. In order to provide a simple example to show the effects of bunching, it is assumed
that the plaintiff lives in a world without a time value of money and that the 2003 tax rates apply
to all prior and past years. Of course, in the real world there exists a time value of money, so the
back-pay amounts would have to be augmented to take into account lost interest, and the front-
pay amounts would have to be discounted to present value. Furthermore, due to the time value
of money, the plaintiff's salary itself would increase over time, as would the amount of front pay
lost, and tax brackets would be adjusted for inflation. It is also assumed for purposes of this ex-
ample that the plaintiff incurs and pays no attorney's fees in connection with the litigation. If
the plaintiff did incur and pay such fees, it might trigger the AMT trap discussed infra Part I.B.
25. Although Title VII states that "[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more
than two years prior to the filing of a charge" of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000), the litigation life of a com-
plicated employment discrimination case may result in a back-pay award covering a substantially
longer period of time. See, e.g., Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 749 F.2d 1451,
1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (awarding seventeen years of back pay).
26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (2004) (providing that cash method taxpayers in-
clude an item of gross income only when the item is actually or constructively received).
27. See id. (same).
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at 33%, and the remaining $78,050 at 35%. 2s This would yield a tax liability
of $117,832.29
Had the plaintiff not received the award in 2003, he would have had
only $40,000 of taxable income, of which $7,000 would be taxed at 10%, the
next $21,400 at 15%, and the remaining $11,600 at 25%, yielding a tax liabil-
ity of $6,810.30 Because of the award, therefore, the plaintiffs tax liability in-
creased by $111,022, the excess of the $117,832 actual tax liability over this
$6,810 hypothetical tax liability. The plaintiffs effective tax rate on the
$350,000 is thus 31.72%, the ratio of $111,022 to $350,000.11
Compare these tax consequences with those that would have resulted
had the taxpayer not suffered from discrimination and received an extra
$25,000 in wages each year over the fourteen-year period. In such a case, the
taxpayer would have had $65,000 of gross income instead of $40,000 in each
of those fourteen years. The first $7,000 would have been taxed at 10%, the
next $21,400 at 15%, and the remaining $36,000 ($25,000 of which repre-
sents the amount of extra wages received) at 25%.2 Accordingly, the extra
28. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (West Supp. 2003) (providing tax rates for single taxpayers).
29. This Article discusses only federal income tax consequences. There may also be differ-
ent state, local, or employment tax consequences when a plaintiff receives wages as one lump
sum rather than as being paid over time.
30. See I.R.C. § 1 (c) (providing tax rates for single taxpayers).
31. It might appear that the plaintiff receives a tax deferral benefit with respect to the
back-pay portion that may absorb part or all of the adverse tax consequences caused by bunch-
ing. There would be no deferral benefit if the interest rate used to determine the amount of
lost interest with respect to the back pay (i.e., pre-judgment interest) is an after-tax interest rate.
For example, assume that a plaintiff recovers $100,000 of wages, representing $10,000 of lost
wages for each of the past ten years. Assume further that the appropriate pre-tax interest rate is
10% and that the plaintiffs marginal tax rate is a constant 30%. Had the plaintiff received the
$10,000 in wages in due course, paid taxes on the wages, and invested the after-tax amount, the
plaintiff would end up with $96,715, the future value after ten years of $7,000 annual payments
invested at an after-tax rate of 7%. If, in the litigation, the plaintiff were awarded the future
value after ten years of the $10,000 annual lost wages invested at a pre-tax rate of 10%, the plain-
tiff would receive $159,374 pre-tax, leaving him with $111,562 after paying 30% in tax, resulting
in a $14,847 windfall. In such a case, the plaintiff is overcompensated because he was able to
defer the tax on the lost wages and the interest on the wages until settlement. However, if the
award were computed using an after-tax discount rate (i.e., 7%), the plaintiff would receive the
appropriate amount. Thus, if the plaintiff were awarded the future value after ten years of the
$10,000 annual lost wages invested at an after-tax rate of 7%, the plaintiff would receive
$138,164 pre-tax, leaving him with $96,715 after paying 30% in tax, the same amount as if the
wages had been earned and invested in due course. Therefore, if an after-tax interest rate is
used in computing prejudgment interest, the plaintiff would receive no deferral benefit, and
the adverse tax consequences attributable to bunching would be felt by the plaintiff in their
entirety. However, if a pre-tax interest rate is used, the plaintiff would receive a deferral benefit,
and if gross ups were allowed, the defendant should be able to argue that this deferral benefit
be considered as an offset in determining the proper amount of the gross up.
32. As noted in note 24, supra, for purposes of this example, it is assumed that the tax-
payer lives in a world without time value of money. The 2003 tax rate tables are used as the
baseline so that those tables are assumed to be appropriate for all years during the relevant pe-
riod, including the pre-award years.
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wages, had they been earned in due course, would have been subject to a
marginal tax rate of 25%, yielding a total tax liability of $87,500 ($6,250 of
tax s per year over fourteen years). This )ields an effective tax rate on the
extra wages of 25%.
In this example, the lump sum award caused the plaintiff to suffer ad-
verse tax consequences in the amount of $23,522,14 the excess of (i)
$111,022-the plaintiffs actual tax liability attributable to the $350,000
award, over (ii) $87,500-the plaintiff's hypothetical tax liability resulting
from the hypothetical annual $25,000 increase in wages during the fourteen-
year period. The $23,522 increased tax liability is due to the fact that the en-
tire award is bunched into a single tax year (2003) instead of being spread
out over the fourteen-year period. Because of this bunching, only $28,800 of
the $350,000 award is subject to a 25% rate, with the remainder being sub-
ject to higher rates.5s If the plaintiff had received the $350,000 ratably over
the fourteen-year period, the entire award would have been subject to a 25%
rate.
This bunching problem is a byproduct of two of the most durable fea-
tures of the federal income tax: the annual accounting system and progres-
33. This is the product of (i) the $25,000 of extra wages earned each year during the pe-
riod, and (ii) the 25% marginal tax rate applicable to those wages.
34. Even though the plaintiff suffers adverse tax consequences in the amount of $23,522,
because a gross up itself would be taxable, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716,
729 (1929) (holding that payment of an employee's taxes by the employer results in further
taxable income for the employee); Ben-Zion, supra note 23, at 233, the gross up would have to
be higher in order to leave the plaintiff with the $23,522 after paying taxes on the entire gross
up. The appropriate gross up equals: x/(l-t), where x equals the amount of the adverse tax
consequences and t equals the tax rate applied to the gross up. Under the facts in the hypo-
thetical, since the plaintiffs marginal tax rate is 35%, the gross up award would have to equal
$36,187, leaving the plaintiff with $23,522 after paying tax on the gross up award. This $23,522
after-tax amount would then absorb the adverse tax consequences suffered by the plaintiff as a
result of bunching. In Ehly v. Cady, 687 P.2d 687, 695 (Mont. 1984), the Montana Supreme
Court inexplicably denied the plaintiff's request for an additional gross up to offset the taxes
the plaintiff would incur as a result of the court's award of an initial gross up for adverse tax
consequences caused by the defendant's contractual breach. This decision has been tightly
criticized. See Oddi v. Ayco Corp., 947 F.2d 257, 268 (7th Cir. 1991) ("To award a plaintiff dam-
ages for what would have been a nontaxable return on his investment yet to award nothing for a
tax he would not have incurred but for the defendant's breach strikes us as unprincipled."). For
a discussion of whether this "gross up upon a gross up" calculation can be criticized on the
ground that it is unduly costly to employers, see discussion in note 278 infra.
35. Compare surpa text accompanying note 28 (concluding that $40,400 of plaintiffs actual
2003 income would be taxed at 25%) with supra text accompanying note 30 (concluding that,
absent the discrimination recovery, only $11,600 of plaintiff's 2003 income would have been
taxed at 25%).
36. As noted in note 24, supra, this simple example did not take into account time value of
money principles. If those principles are considered, then the plaintiff will receive a "lost inter-
est" component in the back-pay award to take into account the fact that the plaintiff would have
been able to invest back wages. As a result, the lump-sum award also bunches together this lost
interest, which would have been earned periodically, into one payment, causing the interest
component to be excessively taxed.
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sive tax rates.5 7 Because taxes are assessed on an annual basis, the progressive
rate structure results in a greater lifetime tax liability for a taxpayer whose
income significantly fluctuates year to year compared to a taxpayer whose
income is stable, even if the two taxpayers earn the same amount of lifetime
income." However, if taxes were assessed on a lifetime basis, or if income
was subject to a single flat rate of tax, these two taxpayers would owe the
same amount of tax: 9
From 1964 to 1986 the Code contained "income-averaging" provisions
that alleviated the bunching problem to some extent.4 These provisions al-
lowed taxpayers whose taxable income was extraordinarily high in a given
year to apply a lower marginal rate to that income.4' In order to be eligible
for the relief, the taxpayer's taxable income in such a year had to be 40%
42higher than his average taxable income for the prior three years. Since the
plaintiff in our example received a huge award relative to his typical income,
had Congress not repealed these income-averaging provisions, the plaintiff
would have been able to apply a lower rate to his award4 This result would
have put the plaintiff closer to the economic position that he would have oc-
cupied had he earned the wages in due course.
Congress, however, repealed this income-averaging rule in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986.44 That Act significantly flattened the tax rate structure, re-
ducing the top rate from 50% to 28%. 45 Because of the flattening of rates,
the Act substantially reduced the potential adverse consequences caused by
bunching. As result, Congress apparently believed that the complexity of in-
37. Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizon-
tal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 509-10.
38. In other words, an "individual with a lifetime income of 50x [is taxed] more heavily if
his income pattern consists of alternating years of zero income and 2x income than if his in-
come were x in each year." Id. at 509.
39. One of the most common examples of bunching concerns the gain from the sale of
long-held property. See Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital
Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 328 (1993) (using stock transactions to show the effect of
bunching). The gain may represent accretions that occurred over the property's holding pe-
riod, yet the entire gain is reported in a single year when it is realized. Id. at 329-30. Alleviation
of this bunching problem is sometimes cited as a justification for a having a lower tax on capital
gains. Id at 330. But this capital gains preference does not apply to pecuniary damage recover-
ies. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2000) (requiring that, in order to have a gain characterized as a long-
term capital gain, the gain must be the result of the "sale or exchange of a capital asset").
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, 105-12 (codifying I.R.C.
§§ 1301-1305). These income-averaging provisions were repealed in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117.
41. See Schmalbeck, supra note 37, at 512-23 (describing the income-averaging provi-
sions).
42. h.R.C. § 1302(a)(1) (1986).
43. See id
44. § 141, 100 Stat. at 2117.
45. § 101, 100 Stat. at 2096-99.
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come averaging now outweighed its fairness benefits.46 And, even though tax
rates have become more progressive since 1986, with a current top rate of
35%,47 there have been no attempts to reinstate income averaging.
B. THE AMT TRAP
1. Description of the Trap
Take the same example, except now the plaintiff, after winning the
$350,000 judgment, petitions the court for statutory attorney's fees pursuant
to the fee-shifting provisions in the anti-discrimination statutes.4 8 The court
grants the petition and awards $650,000 in fees to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
then, pursuant to his fee agreement, pays the attorney the $650,000 of court-
awarded fees. 49 The tax consequences to the plaintiff with regard to this
payment under current law are unclear and complicated.50
In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff must include the entire award, in-
cluding the attorney fee portion of the award, in his gross income and take a
deduction for the attorney fee portion.i We refer to this treatment as the
inclusion/deduction method. In other jurisdictions, the plaintiff is required
52to include only his net recovery of $350,000 in his gross income. We refer
to this treatment as the exclusion method. If the Code allowed the plaintiff a
full and unimpaired deduction for the attorney fee portion, there would be
no effective difference between the two methods because the plaintiff would
always ultimately be taxed only on his $350,000 net recovery.
However, the Code does in fact significantly impair the plaintiff's attor-
ney fee deduction under the inclusion/deduction method. The most signifi-
46. One is forced to speculate as to why the income-averaging provisions were repealed
since there is no explanation in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
47. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
48. See, e.g., ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (incorporating § 16 of the FLSA, which au-
thorizes an award of attorney fees); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (authorizing an
award of attorney fees); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000) (adopting the remedies and enforce-
ment procedures of Tide VII).
49. A typical contingent fee agreement provides that the client will pay the attorney the
greater of (a) some percentage of the client's total recovery (sometimes including statutory at-
torney's fees), or (b) the amount of statutory attorney's fees. In this case, the amount of statu-
tory fees would exceed the agreed-upon percentage.
50. See generally Polsky, supra note 5 (discussing the tax treatment of attorney's fees).
51. See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001) (requiring the
plaintiff to include the attorney fee portion of the award in gross income, but then allowing the
plaintiff to take a deduction for the fees); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2001)
(same); Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 944 (Ist Cir. 1995) (same); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38
T.C. 707, 712 (1962) (same), affd, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
52. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (excluding the attorney
fee portion of the award from the plaintiffs gross income); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353,
364 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
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cant impairment is that, under the AMT, the deduction is disallowed. 53 En-
acted by Congress in 1969 in an attempt to ensure that extremely wealthy
taxpayers do not escape their fair share of taxation through excessive use of
exclusions, deductions, and credits, the AMT is a separate tax regime that
applies to every individual taxpayer. 54 In very general terms, the AMT oper-
ates by disallowing certain exclusions, deductions, and credits and then ap-
plying a lower, flatter rate structure to the taxpayer's resulting alternative
minimum taxable income.55 Each taxpayer is then effectively required to pay
the greater of (i) his liability under the AMT, or (ii) his tax liability under
51,the regular income tax system.
Because the plaintiffs attorney fee deduction is one of the deductions
disallowed under the AMT, the plaintiffs net recovery may be taxed at rates
significantly in excess of the top marginal rate of 35%57 and, in certain cases,
may even be taxed at rates exceeding 100%. 5 8 In these latter cases, the AMT
trap turns an apparent pre-tax "winner" into an after-tax "loser" because the
plaintiff is forced to pay out of pocket some of the taxes incident to the re-
covery.
For example, under the inclusion/deduction method, the hypothetical
plaintiff will include $1,040,000 in gross income in 2003 . Although he will
be able to deduct the $650,000 amount of attorney's fees paid under the
53. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (1) (A) (i) (2000) (disallowing a deduction for miscellaneous itemized
deductions). Even if the AMT is not triggered, the deduction will be limited in other ways. See
Polsky, supra note 5, at 63-67 (describing these other impairments). However, the deduction
disallowance under the AMT is generally most significant for plaintiffs. Deborah A. Geier, Some
Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 532
(2000); Sager c Cohen, supra note 6, at 1077.
54. See BORIS BT-rKER & MARTINJ. MCMAHION, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
45.1, at 45-1 to 45-2 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the purpose of the AMT). Although beyond the
scope of this Article, because of very serious structural flaws, primarily Congress's failure to in-
dex its exemption amounts and rate brackets for inflation, the AMT will soon affect an astound-
ing number of middle class taxpayers. See Burman et al., supra note 3, at 105 (estimating that by
2010 the AMT will affect 33 million taxpayers, half of whom have income of less than $100,000).
55. See BIrKLER & MCMAHON, supra note 54, 45.1, at 45-1 to 45-2 (discussing the opera-
tion of the AMT).
56. See id (same). Technically, taxpayers are required to add to their tax liability-as com-
puted under the regular income tax-the excess, if any, of (i) the amount of their liability as
computed under the AMT, over (ii) their tax liability as computed under the regular income
tax. I.R.C. § 55(a).
57. See Polsky, supra note 5, at 64-67 (giving an example of how this might happen).
58. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 425-26 (2000) (Behge, J., dissenting); see alsoAdam
Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 1, at 18 (de-
scribing case of a discrimination plaintiff who, despite obtaining a $1,250,000 judgment, ended
up with after-tax loss of $99,000).
59. Recall that in the original hypothetical it is assumed that plaintiff will have other in-
come to offset exactly the amount of her standard deduction and personal exemption, which
are not allowed under the AMT. Therefore, technically plaintiff has more gross income; how-
ever, this additional gross income is de minimis and is ignored for purposes of the 'AMT compu-
tations.
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regular income tax,60 this deduction is disallowed under the AMT. 6' This
disallowance will trigger the AMT, and as a result, the plaintiffs 2003 tax
liability will equal $287,700 under this method. 6q Had the taxpayer just
earned his regular salary of $40,000, his tax liability would have been
$6,810.C4 As a result, his tax liability attributable to the recovery is $280,890,
the excess of his $287,700 actual tax liability less the $6,810 hypothetical tax
liability.
Under the exclusion method, however, the plaintiff will include only
$350,000, the amount of his recovery net of attorney's fees. As a result, the
65AMT will not be triggered. Plaintiffs gross income will equal $390,000, and
as computed previously, his tax liability will equal $117,832. 66 Accordingly,
under this method, his tax liability attributable to the recovery is $111,022,
the excess of his $117,832 actual tax liability less his $6,810 hypothetical tax
liability.
Therefore, under the inclusion/deduction method, the plaintiff owes
$169,868 more in taxes than he would under the exclusion method and
$193,390 more in taxes than he would if he would have earned the wages in
due course. We summarize these results in the table below.
60. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000) (allowing a deduction for certain trade or business ex-
penses); Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 944-47 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that employee's legal
fees incurred in connection with employment-related lawsuit are deductible under § 162(a)).
However, even under the regular income tax, the plaintiffs attorney fee deduction would be
impaired to some extent. See hR.C. §§ 67-68 (setting a floor on miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions and an overall limitation on itemized deductions). For a discussion of these impairments
under the regular income tax and their interaction with the AMT's disallowance, see Polsky,
supra note 5, at 65-67.
61. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (1) (A) (i) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized deductions).
62. When we say that the disallowance will "trigger" the AMT, we mean that, because the
plaintiffs very large attorney fee deduction is disallowed under the AMT, the plaintiffs AMT
liability will be greater than her regular tax liability. As a result, the plaintiff will be required to
pay the greater AMT liability.
63. See I.R.C. § 55.
64. See id. §§ 1, 63.
65. The AMT will not be triggered here because, unlike under the inclusion/deduction
method, the plaintiff does not lose any deductions when computing her AMT liability, and as a
result her AMT liability will be less than her regular tax liability. Accordingly, the plaintiff will
only be required to pay her regular tax liability.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 for the computation.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF TAx LIABILITY
EARNED IN EXCLUSION INCLUSION/DEDUcTION




$87,500 $111,022 $280,890TO RECOVERY
NET RECOVERY AFTER TAXES $262,500 $238,978 $69,110




CONSEQUENCES 0 $23,522 $193,390
Thus, under the inclusion/deduction method, the taxpayer's effective
tax rate on his recovery exceeds 80%, and his after-tax recovery is almost
$200,000 less than if he had earned the back pay and front pay in due
course.
This AMT trap is simply awful policy for a number of reasons. The trap
violates fundamental tax policy because by disallowing a deduction for at-
torney's fees, it effectively taxes the plaintiff on the cost of producing the
(taxable) recovery. 68 It is axiomatic that under an income tax the expenses
incurred in producing income must be excluded from the taxpayer's taxable
income. 69 In addition, by excessively taxing discrimination and other civil
rights plaintiffs, the trap "undermines the national policy of encouraging
the pursuit of meritorious civil rights claims."
7
The AMT trap is avoided under the exclusion method, which effectively
allows a full deduction by simply excluding the attorney fee portion of the
recovery from gross income. Therefore, the exclusion method achieves the
correct policy result. However, as described below, the inclusion/deduction
67. As noted in note 34, supra, a gross up award itself would be taxable; therefore, an ap-
propriate gross up would have to be computed using the following formula: gross up = x/(1-t),
where x is the amount of adverse tax consequences and t is the tax rate applicable to the gross
up.
68. Peroni, supra note 5, at 1423; Polsky, supra note 5, at 68-73; James Serven, Oral Argu-
ment in Hukkanen-Campbell: Taxpayer's Last Stand?, 93 TAX NOTES 854, 859 n.39 (2001); Robert
W. Wood, Even Tax Court Itself Divided on Attoraeys'Fee Issue!, 88 TAX NOTES 573, 573 (2000).
69. Hantzis v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (lst Cir. 1981).
70. Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1078. Furthermore, the trap may "create[] very sig-
nificant ethical, fiduciary duty, and malpractice issues for lawyers handling [employment dis-
crimination and civil rights] claims." Gregg D. Polsky, The Contingent Attorney's Fee Tax Trap: Ethi-
cal, Fiduciary Duty, and Malpractice Implications, 23 VA. TAX REV. 615, 637 (2004).
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method is the one followed by a majority of the federal circuits that have
considered the issue.
7 1
2. Source of the Trap
The AMT trap results from the characterization of the plaintiff's attor-
ney's fees as "miscellaneous itemized deductions" under § 67 of the Code.
Section 67(b) defines this term in the negative, treating all itemized deduc-
tions as miscellaneous itemized deductions unless specifically listed in §
67(b) (1) through ( 12 )." Attorney's fees paid by discrimination plaintiffs do
not fit within any of the listed exceptions." As a result, the deductions for
these fees are disallowed for AMT purposes.
7 5
It is clear that Congress did not make a deliberate decision to impair
76these fee deductions in this way. Rather, the AMT trap is the result of mere
inadvertence-a classic case of unintended consequences. Prior to 1992, it
was generally assumed that discrimination awards were, like other personal
injury recoveries, excluded from gross income under Code § 104(a) (2), and
as a result, attorney's fees paid to recover these nontaxable awards were non-
deductible. 77 Accordingly, prior to 1992, no one gave much thought to the
taxation of attorney's fees in discrimination cases.78
However, in the 1992 case of United States v. Burke, the Supreme Court
held that the personal injury exclusion did not apply to an award of back pay
under Title VII. In 1995, the Court likewise held that an award of back pay
and liquidated damages under the ADEA did not qualify for the personal
injury exclusion.80 Shortly thereafter, Congress amended the § 104(a) (2) to
71. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the tax issue underlying the AMT
trap in Commissioner v. Banaitis, 124 S. Ct. 1713 (2004) and Commissioner v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 1712
(2004). As discussed infta notes 287-96 and accompanying text, the likely (but not the only pos-
sible) outcome is that the Court will decide that either the inclusion/deduction method or the
exclusion method applies universally.
72. See Biehl v. Comm'r, 351 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that employee's
legal fees incurred in connection with litigation arising out of employee's employment consti-
tute unreimbursed employee business expenses subject to § 67); Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d
938, 944-47 (1st Cir. 1995) (same). But see Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1096-97 (arguing
that these legal fees should be treated as reimbursed employee business expenses and therefore
taken into account in computing adjusted gross income under § 62(a)).
73. I.R.C. § 67(b) (2000).
74. Id.
75. See id. § 56(b) (1) (A) (i) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized deductions).
76. See Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that the
"anomalous result[s under the AMT trap were] ... no doubt unintended").
77. See Sager & Cohen, supra note 18, at 452-73.
78. See id.
79. 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992).
80. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 (1995).
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allow exclusion only in cases arising out of a personal physical injury.8' Con-
sequently, after 1996 it was clear that discrimination awards were fully tax-
able.82 Because the awards were now taxable, attorney's fees expended in
pursuit of the awards were now deductible, and as a result, the classification
of this fee deduction was for the first time vitally important. "' As noted
above, the Code classifies the fee deduction as a miscellaneous itemized de-
duction, and this classification is the trigger for the AMT trap. It is clear that
the AMT trap is merely an unintended consequence of this evolving tax
treatment of employment discrimination recoveries. Despite repeated calls
for reform,84 Congress has not yet seen fit to amend the Code to fix the AMT
trap by allowing plaintiffs to deduct attorney's fees without impairment.
5
3. Inclusion/Deduction vs. Exclusion
There has been a tremendous amount of litigation regarding the issue
of which method (inclusion/deduction or exclusion) applies.86 A massive
federal circuit court split has resulted, with seven circuits following the in-
clusion/deduction method and three circuits following the exclusion
method.8 7 Courts using the inclusion/deduction method acknowledge that
the method leads to an unfair result, but determine that the Code requires
81. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat.
1755, 1838-39 (amending § 104(a)(2) to require a "physical" injury). As noted supra note 18,
the inconsistent treatment of personal injury awards arising from physical versus nonphysical
injury has been widely criticized by commentators.
82. SeeJulia K Brazelton, The Income Tax Treatment ofDamage Awards, 75 TAXES 562, 570-71
(1997) (discussing the effect of the 1996 change).
83. Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1079.
84. See 2002 IRS ANN. REP. TO CONG. 169 [hereinafter NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
REPORT] (advocating that § 62 be amended to add these deductions to those which are taken
into account in computing the taxpayer's adjusted gross income); see also Polsky, supra note 5, at
120 (same). Another possible solution would be to amend § 104(a) (2) to exclude discrimina-
tion recoveries from gross income. See, e.g., Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, 108th
Cong. (exemplifying a Senate bill that would exclude discrimination awards from gross income,
but was not enacted). Many commentators have argued that, as a general policy matter, these
damages should be excluded. See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, supra note 18 (contending that the cur-
rent treatment creates gender and race bias); Burke & Friel, supra note 18 (highlighting many
policy reasons for excluding the damages); Sager & Cohen, supra note 18 (contending that the
inclusion of damages is discriminatory); Wolff, supra note 18 (contending that there is no policy
reason for including discrimination damages in gross income). If these damages were entirely
excluded, the AMT trap would no longer affect discrimination plaintiffs; however, the AMT
trap would persist for plaintiffs filing employment-related claims not involving discrimination,
as well as consumer fraud claims, defamation claims, claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, claims for punitive damages, and many other common claims.
85. Several bills have been proposed that would fix the AMT trap in discrimination cases,
but they have not been enacted. See, e.g., Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, 108th Cong.
(excluding unlawful discrimination damages from gross income).
86. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 84, at 164-65 (describing the
litigation).
87. Id. at 161-66 (describing the circuit split on the issue).
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such a result."" Courts using the exclusion method appear to use a creative,
arguably strained characterization of contingent fee arrangements to
achieve a fair result8 9
The issue centers on the characterization of the contingent fee agree-
ment.90 Courts using the exclusion method determine that the fee agree-
ment operates to transfer a portion of the plaintiffs claim to the attorney.91
Under this view, when the attorney is paid, the payment is attributable to the
attorney's prior interest in the claim, and therefore, the payment is not in-
cluded in the plaintiffs gross income."
2
Courts using the inclusion/deduction method determine either that (i)
the contingent fee agreement effects no such transfer of a portion of the
claim,93 or (ii) if such a transfer is deemed to occur, that the transfer is inef-
fective for tax purposes under the assignment of income doctrine.94 As a re-
sult, these courts hold that the plaintiff must include the full amount of the
recovery (including the attorney fee portion) in gross income and then takeS 95
a deduction for the attorney fee portion.
In determining which method is appropriate, some courts have ana-
lyzed the relevant state attorney lien law to determine the strength of the at-
96torney's rights and powers with respect to the plaintiffs claim. In general,
these courts evaluate underlying attorney lien law to determine to what ex-
tent this law grants attorneys proprietary interests in plaintiffs' causes of ac-
tion. It is beyond this scope of this Article to analyze in depth this tax issue,"
though it is clear that the courts are woefully confused and that they have
created a terrific mess. What is important for our purposes now is to explain
88. E.g., Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 946 (Ist Cir. 1995).
89. E.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 382-86 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Polsky, supra note
5, at 78-120 (describing and analyzing these characterizations).
90. See Polsky, supra note 5, at 74-78 (same).
91. See, e.g., Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000) (allowing a plaintiff to
exclude the attorney fee portion of the award from gross income when the fee was contingent
upon winning); Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); Estate of Clarks
v. Comm'r, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Comam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125
(5th Cir. 1959) (same).
92. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
93. Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2001).
94. Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268
F.3d 756, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of the assignment of income doctrine in the
context of contingent fee arrangements, see Polsky, supra note 5, at 78-92.
95. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring inclusion of
attorney fee portion of award in gross income); Young, 240 F.3d at 376-78 (same); Coady v.
Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
96. See, e.g., Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2004); Coady, 213
F.3d at 1190; Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
97. For a full discussion of the attorney lien issue, see generally Thad Davis, Cotnam v.
Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment of Contingency-Based Attorneys' Fees-The Alabama At-
torneys Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-On, 51 AIA. L. REV. 1683 (2000).
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the state of the tax law as it exists right now, which the below chart demon-
strates:
TABLE 2: STATE OF THE TAX LAW BY CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT METHOD DOEs STATE LIEN WHAT STATE LAW
LAW MATTER? ANALYZED?
FIRST Inclusion/Deduction9 8 No 99  N/A
SECOND Inclusion/Deduction Yes Vermont
THIRD Inclusion/Deduction 1° 1  No N/A
FOURTH Inclusion/Deduction 102 No N/A
FIFTH Exclusion 0 3  No N/A
SIXTH Exclusion 104  No N/A
SEVENTH Inclusion/Deduction1 5  No 106 N/A
EIGHTH No decision yet N/A N/A




TENTH Inclusion/Deduction No N/A
ELEVENTH Exclusion1 12  Yes Alabama
FEDERAL Inclusion/Deduction 11  Yes Maiyland
D.C. No decision yet N/A N/A
98. Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1995).
99. The Alexander court did not address state attorney lien law in its analysis. Though it did
not explicitly disclaim the lien law's relevance, we assume that, in failing to address the ques-
tion, it implicitly did so. See id.
100. Raymond, 355 F. 3d at 117.
101. O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532, 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
102. Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2001).
103. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000); Comam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d
119, 121 (5th Cir. 1959).
104. Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003); Estate of Clarks v. United States,
202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2000).
105. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883-85 (7th Cir. 2001).
106. WhileJudge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in the Kenseth opinion, does refer
to underlying attorney lien law, he does so only to note simply that the attorney is granted a
security interest in, and not ownership of, the plaintiff's claim. Id at 883. Since all attorney lien
laws grant only such a security interest, it would appear that the Seventh Circuit would apply the
inclusion/deduction method universally.
107. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
decisions.
108. Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000).
109. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074,1083 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. Campbellv. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001).
112. Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1348 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
113. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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Under current law, therefore, the AMT trap arises in all tax cases ap-
pealable to the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh and Tenth circuits, regardless
of state attorney lien law.114 On the other hand, the AMT trap will never
arise in the Fifth and Sixth circuits." 5
In the Second and Federal Circuits, the courts of appeal have used the
inclusion/deduction method, but in so doing they analyzed underlying at-
torney lien law in Vermont" 6 and Massachusetts' 17 respectively. As a result,
even though it is clear that plaintiffs whose fee arrangements were governed
by the same state law would face the AMT trap in those circuits, it is unclear
what these courts would do if they were faced with attorney lien law from
other states. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, in following the exclusion
method, relied on Alabama's attorney lien law; thus, while there would be
no AMT trap for Alabama plaintiffs who were within the Eleventh Circuit's
jurisdiction, the answer is not clear for plaintiffs whose fee arrangement is
governed by non-Alabama lien law.""
The Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence on this issue is particularly bizarre in
that it appears as if there is a "split" within the circuit. In Sinyard v. Commis-
sioner, a panel of the Ninth Circuit followed the inclusion/deduction
method and concluded that the underlying state attorney lien law was com-
pletely irrelevant to the issue." 9 In two earlier cases, panels of the Ninth Cir-
cuit followed the inclusion/deduction method only after analyzing Califor-
nia and Alaska attorney lien statutes. 20 Recently however, another panel of
the court, in a case involving the Oregon attorney lien law, followed the ex-
clusion method after an analysis of that law. 12 As a result, the most conserva-
tive conclusions to be drawn from the Ninth Circuit are the following: (i)
plaintiffs within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction whose fee agreements are
governed by California or Alaska law will be subject to the AMT trap; (ii)
plaintiffs within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction whose fee agreements are
governed by Oregon law will not be subject to the AMT trap; and (iii) the
AMT trap implications for all other plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit are not
clear.
114. Campbel 274 F.3d at 1314; Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2001); Alex-
ander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1995); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712, affd,
319 F.2d 532, 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
115. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2000); Banks v. Comrn'r, 345 F.3d
373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003).
116. Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2004).
117. Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
118. Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1348 (1lth Cir. 2000).
119. Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2001).
120. Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (California); Coady v.
Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (Alaska).
121. Banaitis v. Comrn'r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2003).
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e c t 122The chart below displays the above conclusions:
TABLE 3: PLAINTIFF'S FEE AGREEMENT AND STATE LIEN LAWS
CIRCUIT PLAINTIFFS WHOSE FEE PLAINTIFFS WHOSE FEE LAw IS UNCERTAINFOR
AGREEMENTS UNDER AGREEMENTS UNDER PLAINTIFFS WHOSE FEE
THESE STArEATITONFY THESE STATE ArTORNEY AGREEMENTS ARE
LIEN LAWS LIEN LAWS ARE CLEARLY GOVERNED BY THESE
ARE CLEARLY SUBJECT NOTSUBJECT TO THE STATES' ATTORNEY LIEN
TO THE AMT TRAP AMT TRAP LAWS
FIRST All states None None
SECOND Vermont None All but Vermont
THIRD All states None None
FOURTH All states None None
FIFTH None All states None
SIXTH None All states None
SEVENTH All states None None
EIGHTH None None All states
NINTH California, Alaska Oregon All but California, Alaska
and Oregon
TENTH All states None None
ELEVENTH None Alabama All but Alabama
FEDERAL Maryland None All but Maryland
D.C. None None All states
In determining the existence of adverse tax consequences attributable
to the AMT trap, cases in which it is clear that, based on current law, the
AMT trap will apply (those cases in column two) or will not apply (those
cases in column three) will provide for an easy determination. However, in
all other cases (those cases in column four), determining the existence of
the plaintiff's adverse tax consequences will prove to be more difficult, since
it would be unclear whether the AMT trap will be implicated. Determining
the amount of adverse tax consequences in these column four cases would
require some speculation as to how the reviewing circuit court would analyze
the tax issue.
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
with respect to the tax issue in two consolidated cases, predicting whether a
plaintiff will be subject to the AMT trap is even more complicated, though
the Court probably will clarify the matter for future cases. We discuss the
122. As previously noted supra note 71, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in
two cases. The chart is based on the law that existed as of August 1, 2004, before the Court's
decision in these two cases. For a discussion of the possible outcomes in these cases, see Part
IV.C.2. infta
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upcoming Court decision in more depth in Part 1V.C.2, but for all other
parts of this Article we assume that the plaintiff lives in ajurisdiction where it
is clear that the AMT trap will be implicated (i.e., column two cases).
4. Does it Matter Whether the Fees Are Paid Pursuant
to aJudgment Rather than a Settlement?
All of the reported decisions analyzing the AMT trap have involved set-
tlements where either the plaintiff has paid his attorney the relevant amount
of fees out of her total recovery, or where the defendant, pursuant to the
terms of the settlement, wrote two different checks-one to the plaintiff rep-
resenting his net recovery and one to the plaintiffs attorney representing his
fee. l2 ' None have involved the situation that we address in this paper-where
the defendant pays the plaintiffs attorney, not pursuant to a settlement, but
rather pursuant to a court order under a fee-shifting statute after a victory by
the plaintiff at trial.
124
In order to explain this issue a bit better, consider the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Sinyard v. Commissioner.125 Sinyard involved the settlement of an
age discrimination claim filed pursuant to the ADEA.1 26 Upon settlement,
one-third of the total settlement amount was paid directly to the plaintiffs
attorney as his fee.' 27 The tax issue was whether the plaintiff was required to
include the entire settlement amount in his gross income (and receive a
miscellaneous itemized deduction for the payment of the fees), or whether
he could merely exclude the attorney fee portion of the recovery.128
Under the ADEA, like the other anti-discrimination statutes, a success-
ful plaintiff is entitled to statutory attorney's fees. 129 This potential obligation
of the defendant to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees was presumably
123. See Porter v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 293 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C.
2003) (stating that "[no court has squarely held that a Title VII award (as distinct from a fee
payable from a lump sum settlement) is as taxable to the successful plaintiff as the contingent
fee payable from an ordinary award of damages"). One case that followed the inclu-
sion/deduction method, Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2000), did in-
volve payment of fees after ajudgment, but that case did not involve a fee-shifting statute.
124. Cf Coady, 213 F.3d at 1187-88 (exemplifying a case that involves payment of fees after
a judgment, but not under a fee-shifting statute). One case assumed without any discussion
whatsoever that the AMT trap would apply equally to cases ill which the attorney's fees were
paid under a court order pursuant to a fee-shifting statute. See Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist., 207 F.
Supp. 2d 764, 777 (N.D. 11. 2002). This case is discussed in more detail in Part II.B.2 infra.
125. 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001),
126. Id. at 757.
127. Ld. The computation of the attorney's one-third portion of the settlement was com-
puted after reducing the settlement amount by the amount of costs reimbursed to the attorney.
128. Id.
129. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (incorporating § 16 of the FLSA, which author-
izes an award of attorney fees); see also Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (k) (2000) (allowing courts to
award attorney fees to successful discrimination plaintiffs); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000)
(adopting the remedies and enforcement procedures of Title VII).
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wrapped up into the settlement amount since, if the plaintiff had prevailed
at trial, the defendant would be responsible for the plaintiffs fees. The
plaintiff in Sinyard argued that because the underlying statutory claim pro-
vided for fee-shifting, the attorney's fees paid directly by defendant to the
attorney should not be deemed to "flow through" the plaintiff.'" To state
the argument a bit differently, because the statute obligates the defendant to
pay the attorney's fees, the plaintiff does not realize gross income upon such
payment.
The court rejected this argument, citing the famous Supreme Court tax
case of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner."1' Old Colony Trust held that when
a third party discharges the taxpayer's obligation, the taxpayer realizes gross
income in the amount of the discharged obligation. "2 According to the Sin-
yard Court, such a discharge occurred because the contingent fee agreement
obligated the plaintiff to pay the attorney an amount of fees, and the defen-
dant paid them on the plaintiffs behalf pursuant to the settlement. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the contingent fee agree-
ment obligated the plaintiff to pay his lawyer the specified percentage of the
recovery, and that under the ADEA "attorney's fees are available to prevail-
ing plaintiffs, not to plaintiffs counsel." 33 According to the Court, when the
defendant paid the plaintiff s attorney directly, it was merely discharging (on
behalf of the plaintiff) the plaintiffs obligation to pay the attorney under
the contingent fee agreement.14 Consequently, the attorney fee portion of
the settlement was included in the plaintiff's gross income.1
35
The question then arises whether the outcome in Sinyard would have
been different if the case had proceeded to trial and the defendant had paid
the statutory attorney's fees pursuant to a court order. We believe that the
answer is no. Before we get to our analysis of this issue, it should first be
pointed out that the typical contingent fee agreement in a discrimination
claim obligates the plaintiff to pay the attorney the greater of (i) some speci-
fied percentage of the plaintiff's overall recovery (sometimes including
court-awarded fees), or (ii) the amount of the court-awarded fees.
There are three reasons why the Sinyard analysis should apply equally to
statutory attorney's fees paid after trial pursuant to a court order. First, as
Sinyard itself notes,136 it is the plaintiff and not the attorney who has the right
under the statute to petition for court-awarded fees, and the court-awarded
130. Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 758.
131. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
132. Id. at 726.
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fees are payable to the plaintiff and not the attorney. 37 Second, assuming
that a typical contingent fee agreement (as described above) governs the
plaintiff's relationship with the attorney, by paying court-awarded fees to the
attorney directly, the defendant is merely discharging the plaintiffs own ob-
ligation to pay the attorney that amount pursuant to the contingent fee
agreement;138 therefore, under Old Colony Trust, the discharge results in
gross income to the plaintiff.'1" Third, a contrary rule would create the per-
verse tax incentive to not settle a case. If the only way to avoid the AMT trap
would be to take the case all the way to trial and obtain and collect a judg-
ment, then the AMT trap would constitute a significant economic impedi-
ment to settlement at any point during the case (i.e., before trial, during
trial, after trial and pending appeal) in claims brought pursuant to fee-
shifting statutes. For these reasons, whether the defendant pays the plain-
tiffs attorney's fees pursuant to a settlement or a court order should not af-
fect whether the AMT trap is implicated. 140
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (providing that a prevailing plaintiff in civil rights
litigation under Title VII is eligible to receive reasonable attorney's fees); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1989) (holding that the ordinary calculation of the statutory fee
award is appropriate even if the plaintiff pays the attorney by the hour and the aggregate
amount of such actual fee is different than the amount computed under the ordinary calcula-
tion); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1986) (finding that in enacting the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act, "Congress bestowed on the 'prevailing party' a statutory eligibility for a dis-
cretionary award of attorney's fees in specified civil actions," but did not "bestow[ ] fee awards
upon attorneys" and, as a result, holding that prevailing parties can waive, settle, or negotiate
their rights to such fees without the consent of their attorney (emphasis added)); Blum v. Sten-
son, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (awarding statutory fee award even where plaintiff was repre-
sented for free by nonprofit legal aid organization).
138. Cf Vengas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990) (holding that a statutory fee award is
independent of any private agreement between the plaintiff and the attorney, and accordingly,
that the parties may negotiate for a fee that exceeds the amount of the statutory fee award); see
also Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 872-75 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that absent
contractual arrangement to the contrary, § 1988 requires that statutory fee awards be paid to
plaintiffs, not plaintiffs counsel).
139. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 726 (1929).
140. Professors Laura Sager and Stephen Cohen have argued that in employment-related
cases, the plaintiff s attorney's fee deduction should be characterized as a reimbursed employee
business expense. Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1096-97. If this characterization were to pre-
vail, the ANIT trap would not arise because the fee deduction would be unimpaired. However,
the courts have not agreed with this analysis. See Biehl v. Comm'r, 351 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the attorney fee deduction is not considered a reimbursed employee
business expense); Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 944-47 (1st Cir. 1995) (same). Professors
Sager and Cohen have further argued that the characterization of the fee deduction as a reim-
bursed employee business expense is particularly strong in employment-related cases where the
fees are awarded pursuant to a court order. Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1098-99. Although
no decision has yet addressed this characterization issue with respect to cases involving court-
awarded fees (as opposed to fees paid pursuant to a settlement), the most recent decision on
the characterization issue suggests that Professors Sager's and Cohen's argument would fail
even in cases involving court-awarded fees. See Biehl 351 F.3d at 987 (holding that in order for a
payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees in an employment-related case to be considered a reim-
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II. CASES THAT HAVE DIRECTLYADDRESSED THE GROSS UP QUESTION
Part I demonstrated why discrimination plaintiffs who receive pecuniary
damages may suffer adverse tax consequences. This Part considers the exist-
ing case law with respect to the question of whether judges have the ability
to shift the burden of those consequences to defendants by requiring de-
fendants to gross up plaintiffs.
A. CASES ADDRESSING THE BUNCHING PROBLEM
Several cases have addressed the propriety of gross ups for adverse tax
consequences caused by the bunching of multi-year income into a single
year. Only two circuit court decisions have squarely addressed the issue, with
each coming to a different conclusion.
1. Cases in Support of Gross Ups for Bunching
The leading case in support of gross ups to compensate for adverse tax
consequences caused by bunching is the 1984 decision of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.141 In that
case, the trial court had awarded seventeen years worth of back pay to a class
of train porters to remedy a long-running race-based violation of Title VII. 142
The payment of this award in a lump sum would have placed most of the
members of the class in the highest income tax bracket for the year of re-
ceipt. Noting the wide discretion that courts have in fashioning remedies to
make victims of discrimination whole, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion "when it included a tax component in the
back pay award to compensate class members for their additional tax liabil-
ity., 143 The court stated, "A tax component may not be appropriate in a typi-
cal Title VII case. But this case presents special circumstances in view of the
protracted nature of the litigation."144 The special circumstance in the in-
stant case was the extreme amount of bunching present-wages that the
plaintiff would have earned over seventeen years were now bunched to-
gether into a single year.
Several lower court cases, as well as some agencies,145 have followed the
Sears decision and allowed gross ups for bunching. One of these cases,
bursed employee business expense, the payment would have to occur while the plaintiff was still
employed by the payor and would have to represent an expense that was incurred by the plain-
tiff on behalf of the payor).
141. 749 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1984).
142. Id. at 1453.
143. Id. at 1456.
144. Id.
145. See ERNEST C. HADLEY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW &
PRACTICE 1461-62 (2003) (discussing federal sector cases authorizing a monetary supplement
to compensate for enhanced income tax liability); Memorandum from the NLRB General
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers in Charge and Resident Officers (Sept. 22, 2000)
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O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,1 46 is particularly instructive. The federal dis-
trict court in that case awarded back pay, front pay, and liquidated damages
under the ADEA as well as compensatory damages under the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act.147 Upon plaintiff's motion, the court enhanced the
back-pay and front-pay awards to compensate for the negative tax conse-
quences of the lump-sum award. 14 The court explained:
As the television advertisement of a few years ago said: "It's not how
much you make, it is how much you keep." The goal of the ADEA is
to allow plaintiff to keep the same amount of money as if he had not
been unlawfully terminated. Compliance with this goal requires re-
imbursement for the reduced amount of front pay money that the
plaintiff has to invest as a result of higher taxes, as well as reim-
bursement for the higher taxes he must pay on his back wages by
getting this money in a lump sum.'
49
The ONeill court therefore explicitly "thought" in terms of after-tax dollars,
at least with respect to pecuniary damages. Because the plaintiff, due to
bunching, would have received fewer after-tax dollars than he would have




The O'Neill court, however, declined to order a tax supplement for the
compensatory and liquidated damage (i.e., the non-pecuniary) portions of
the award. The court explained that the compensatory and punitive damage
awards were not make-whole relief, but solely a product of the lawsuit. 51 Ac-
cording to the court: "Hence, allowing the plaintiff to recover the increased
tax he will have to pay on these [compensatory and punitive] sums does
(on file with the Iowa Law Review) (advising regional directors to seek a tax component to re-
imburse discriminatees for excess tax liability resulting from a lump-sum-backpay award).
146. 108 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 446.
149. Id. at 447; see also Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 455, 455 1.2 (3d Cir. 1987) (re-
manding, after defendant conceded that a gross up for bunching was appropriate, back to the
trial court for a precise computation of the amount of the gross up, but specifically noting that
due to defendant's concession, it had no occasion to "address the question of whether [a gross
up] award [to compensate for bunching] should be made in all hack pay cases"); Arneson v.
Sullivan, 958 F. Stipp. 443, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (following Sears in awarding a tax gross up
where nine years of wages were bunched together into a single year); cf. Blim v. W. Elec. Co.,
731 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984) (denying summarily age discrimination plaintiff's plea for
gross up because the income-averaging provisions then in effect would sufficiently ameliorate
any significant adverse tax consequences).
150. However, the court's gross up was inadequate because it did not take into account the
fact that the gross up itself was taxable. See Ben-Zion, supra note 23, at 241 n. 16 (explaining that
because the gross up was taxable, the gross up in O'Neill should have been $54,086 instead of
$38,780 in order to make the plaintiff whole).
151. O'Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2dat448.
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more than make him whole. It gives the plaintiff a windfall."'' 2 In other
words, the O'Neill court recognized that while there was an obvious "base-
line" to be used for determining adverse tax consequences for pecuniary
awards-the amount of after-tax wages the plaintiff would have had in the
absence of discrimination-there was no similarly obvious baseline for com-
pensatory or liquidated damages. Although this computational point is im-
portant, and we will discuss it in more depth below, 13 the O'Neill decision
clearly supports the proposition that courts may award gross ups to compen-
sate the plaintiff for adverse tax consequences caused by bunching to the ex-
tent that the pecuniary damages are adversely affected. 1
54
2. Cases Against Gross Ups for Bunching
The leading case against gross ups for adverse tax consequences caused
by bunching is the 1994 D.C. Circuit case of Dashnaw v. Pena.'55 In that case,
the court summarily denied the plaintiffs plea for a gross up as follows:
[The plaintiff] also argues that the District Court should have
granted him additional compensation to help cover the higher
taxes he will have to pay because he will receive his backpay in a
lump sum rather than as salary paid out over a period of years. Ab-
sent an arrangement by voluntary settlement of the parties, the
general rule that victims of discrimination should be made whole
does not support "gross-ups" of backpay to cover tax liability. We
know of no authority for such relief, and appellee pointes to none.
Given the complete lack of support in existing case law for tax
gross-ups, we decline to extend the law in this case.' 55
The Dashnaw court therefore denied the gross up based solely on the per-
ceived absence of authority. Yet, as discussed above, the Tenth Circuit deci-
sion in Sears ten years earlier was directly on point and supported the propo-
sition that gross ups were appropriate in certain instances to neutralize the
adverse tax consequences caused by bunching.
157
152. Id.
153. Seediscussion infra Part V (discussing gross ups in complex cases).
154. The O'Neill court noted that the calculation of a tax effect supplement generally will
require an expert's analysis in a properly developed record. 108 F. Supp. at 447; see also Gelof v.
Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 455-56 (3d Cir. 1987) (remanding, after defendant conceded that a
gross up for bunching was appropriate, the issue of a tax effect supplement for further expert
testimony and findings as to the appropriate calculation); Shovlin v. Timemed Labeling Sys.,
Inc., No. 95-CV-4808, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1997) (denying gross
up because "there was no testimony by a tax expert calculating the 'negative tax consequences'
to the Plaintiffin the future in connection with an award of back pay and front pay").
155. 12 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
156. Id. at 1116.
157. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Sears case).
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Similarly, a 1998 federal district court in Illinois denied the plaintiffs
request for a gross up to counteract bunching. Citing to Dashnaw without
any discussion, the court accepted the defendant's argument that the plain-
tiff "is responsible for his own taxes just as if he had remained a[n] . .. em-
ployee" of the defendant.
5
B. CASES ADDRESSING THE AMT TRAP
Unlike the issue of gross ups for bunching, with respect to which two
circuit courts and several lower courts have spoken, only one federal district
court has directly addressed the gross-up question in the AMT trap context.
Other cases have not addressed the precise question, although they remain
relevant to the issue.
1. Cases in Support of AMT Trap Gross Ups
The only case directly on point is Porter v. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development,159 a 2003 decision of the federal district court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In that Title VII case, the court awarded $30,000 in com-
pensatory non-pecuniary damages and more than $200,000 in attorney fees
and litigation expenses.' 6 Given these figures, it was likely that, if the inclu-
sion/deduction method were applied, the AMT trap would be implicated,
causing the plaintiff to owe more in federal taxes than his $30,000 recov-
ery.'r' In an attempt to avoid this unfair result, the plaintiff requested that
the court order the defendant to award a tax gross up.
In addressing the issue, the court first determined that it had the equi
table power under Tide VII to order such relief:
158. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 770, 776 (N.D. 11. 1998). The Best court also cited
to Hukkanen v. IUOE Local No.101, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993). However, although the court in
Hukkanen ruled that the district court's denial of the plaintiffs plea for a gross up was not an
abuse of discretion, the court explicitly acknowledged that the district court's denial was based
strictly on evidentiary grounds (because the plaintiff did not produce expert testimony regard-
ing the existence and amount of adverse tax consequences), not on the merits of the plaintiffs
gross up argument. ld. at 287. Therefore, the Hukkann decision is not relevant to the threshold
issue of whether a gross up would be appropriate if adverse tax consequences were proven.
Likewise, a federal district court in Pennsylvania, in summarily denying a discrimination plain-
tiffs tax gross up request, cited highly questionable authority. Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 15 F.
Supp. 2d 621, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1998). In support of its denial, the Becker court cited Shovlin, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2350, at *6, which denied a gross up request strictly on evidentiary grounds,
and Young v. Lukens Steel Co., 881 F. Supp. 962, 978 (E.D. Pa. 1994), which denied a gross up
request because the court determined that there were no adverse tax consequences after con-
cluding that the plaintiff's recovery was entirely non-taxable.
159. 293 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2003).
160. lr. at 154. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff initiated the litigation pro se and
sought counsel only upon repeated urging by the court. Because he obtained counsel and was
awarded statutory fees (and because the court declined to order a gross up), he was potentially
subject to the AMT trap, which could subject him to a tax liability well in excess of his $30,000
recovery.
161. Id. at 155.
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If Porter's liability to pay tax on the attorneys' fee award in this case
was established as a matter of law, and if that tax could be calcu-
lated with precision, I believe that I could enter a gross-up order in
the exercise of the "full equitable powers" I have to effectuate the
purposes of Title VII.... Such an order would be necessary to
"make [Porter] whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination," because the imposition of a tax that
would reduce his compensatory damage award would leave him less
than whole.
62
Nonetheless, the court ultimately declined to award a gross up in this case
because the record did not establish the plaintiff's tax liability with preci-
sion.' 63 The court determined that the potential adverse tax consequences
resulting from the AMT trap were contingent, and as a result, the court de-
clined to exercise its authority to award a tax gross up.164
Though not entirely clear, it appears that the court determined that the
AMT trap implications were contingent for two reasons. First, the D.C. Cir-
cuit was one of two circuits that had not yet weighed in on the underlying
tax issue.'65 If the D.C. Circuit faced the tax issue and decided to follow the
exclusion method (rather than the inclusion/deduction method), then
there would be no adverse tax consequences arising from the AMT trap, and
a gross up would provide a windfall for the plaintiff.
Second, the court noted that "[n]o case has squarely held that a Title
VII fee award (as distinct from a fee payable from a lump sum settlement)" is
includible in the plaintiff's gross income.'6 The court apparently believed
that because the attorney's fees paid in the instant case would be pursuant to
court order rather than a negotiated settlement, the D.C. Circuit might ex-
clude the fees from the plaintiff's gross income even if the circuit would
hold otherwise in the case of a settlement. This possibility appeared to rein-
force the court's view that the plaintiff's AMT trap implications constituted a
contingent, rather than liquidated, liability for which no gross up would be
appropriate. However, as discussed above, it should make absolutely no dif-
ference from a tax perspective whether the attorney's fees are payable out of
a negotiated settlement or through a court order under a fee-shifting stat-
ute.
16 7
The court did not indicate which of these two contingencies was more
significant, or if the absence of one of these contingencies would have
162. Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Porter, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
165. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (charting how the circuits have weighed
in on the issue, the D.C. Circuit being labeled "no decision yet').
166. Porter, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 123-40.
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changed the result. Thus, it is not clear whether the Porter court would have
decided the case differently had it been within, for example, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, which applies the inclusion/deduction method to all cases.
In any event, even though the court declined to enter the gross up in
the particular case, the Porter case suggests that judges have the authority to
enter gross ups for plaintiffs who suffer adverse tax consequences arising
from the AMT trap.16 At the same time, the Porter decision requires that the
adverse tax consequences be fixed in order for a gross up to be awarded.'6 9
Two state court decisions also provide support for the notion that AMT
trap gross ups are within the equitable authority of courts to redress dis-
crimination, though each involves an interpretation of state rather than fed-
eral, discrimination statutes. The first of these cases is Blaney v. International
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District No. 160,170 a 2004 Washing-
ton Supreme Court decision construing the Washington Law Against Dis-
crimination ("WLAD") in a successful case of gender-based discrimination in
which the plaintiff was awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The
court determined, under the WLAD's remedial authorization, that a gross
up was appropriate to offset the adverse tax consequences resulting from the
AMT trap. 17 In reaching this determination, the court reviewed the perti-
nent federal and state case law and found such an award to be consistent
with both the make-whole principles espoused by the United States Supreme
Court and the federal cases awarding a gross up to counteract bunching.
72
The Blaney court placed particular emphasis on the similarity of language in
WLAD and Title VII empowering courts to employ equitable powers in fash-
ioning remedies to deter discrimination.'
73
168. Porter, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 154. Shvlin v. Timemed Labeling Systems, Inc., No. 95-CV-4808,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1997), also appeared to consider the ques-
tion of whether a gross up would be permitted under the ADEA to counteract the adverse tax
consequences caused by the AMT trap. In that case, the plaintiff requested a gross up to coun-
teract adverse tax consequences caused by bunching "as well as the negative tax consequences
he may incur in the future in the event the Internal Revenue Service determines that an award
of attorney fees to his counsel ... [is] taxable to the Plaintiff as gross income." Id. The Shovlin
court denied the request based on evidentiary grounds because the plaintiff did not produce an
expert to testify as to the calculation of adverse tax consequences. Id.
169. Porter, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
170. 87 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2004).
171. Id. at 760 n.2. The court noted that Blaney would incur an additional $244,753 in fed-
eral income taxes as a result of the operation of the AMT in disallowing portions of her attorney
fees as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id,
172. Id. at 763-64.
173 Id. at 764. The intermediate court of appeals decision affirmed by the Washington Su-
preme Court in Blaney noted that gross ups also serve sound policy ends in that they compen-
sate for tax consequences that "threaten[] to thwart meritorious suits because a highly success-
ful plaintiff runs the risk of having the entire benefit of a judgment eliminated plus incurring a
substantial tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service." Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, District No. 160, 55 P.3d 1208, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
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The second state court decision that supports AMT trap gross ups is Fer-
rante v. Sciaretta, 74 a 2003 decision of the NewJersey Superior Court. Ajury
in that case awarded Mary Ferrante, a victim of sexual harassment, approxi-
mately $340,000 in back and front pay, $26,000 for emotional distress, and
$895,000 in attorney fees and disbursements.7 5 The jury awarded these
amounts under New Jersey's Laws Against Discrimination. These laws, ac-
cording to the court, share with federal anti-discrimination statutes the goal
of making whole the victims of discrimination.17 5 In a supplemental proceed-
ing, the New Jersey court reviewed favorably the O'Neill and Blaney decisions
and concluded that the make-whole statutory objective supported a gross-up
award of $107,000. Although the court described the award as compensa-
tion for a lump-sum award,1 78 the large amount of the supplement, 79 the
high ratio of attorney's fees to overall recovery, as well as the court's discus-
sion of AMT computations and its reliance on Blaney,1 8 0 suggests that the
gross up related, at least in part, to adverse tax consequences resulting from
the AMT trap.
Although these two state court decisions are not directly on point in
that they interpret state, rather than federal, anti-discrimination law, they
are relevant for two reasons. First, the underlying state laws share the same
broad make-whole purposes as federal anti-discrimination law. Second, both
cases favorably cite federal cases that allowed gross ups for bunching to sup-
port their decisions to award AMT trap gross ups.
This second point raises the question of whether gross ups might be
permitted only for bunching, but not for the AMT trap, or vice versa. There
is no reason to treat adverse tax consequences differently depending on the
source of that consequence. One can debate the basic question of whether
gross ups are permissible (or even required) for adverse tax consequences
suffered by plaintiffs, but it seems to us that one must conclude that the an-
swer is the same whether the consequences arise from bunching or the AMT
trap. A tax supplement in each instance serves the same core purpose of
making the victims of discrimination whole in an economic sense. Of course,
as the Porter case recognizes, there may be some uncertainty in determining
whether the AMT trap will be implicated in cases where the underlying tax
issue is unclear. But that is not an issue regarding the propriety of a gross
174. No. HNT L-584-02, 2003 N.J. Super. LEXIS 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2003).
175 Id. at *2.
176. Id. at *5.
177. Id. at *6--8.
178. Id. at *8.
179. The total amount of damages (not including attorney's fees or the tax gross up)
awarded to the plaintiff was approximately $440,000. Ferrante, 2003 N.J. Super. LEXIS 408, at *2.
Because of the large size of the gross up relative to these damages, it is unlikely that the gross tip
was merely the result of bunching.
180. Id. at *7-9.
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up, but rather that is an issue regarding the existence and amount of adverse
tax consequences.
2. Case Against AMT Trap Gross Ups
While Porter is the only case to address squarely the AMT trap gross-up
issue under federal anti-discrimination law, another district court case, while
not directly addressing this precise issue, supports the view that such gross
ups are not permitted. In Spina v. Forest Preserve District, the plaintiff sued her
employer under Tide VII and § 1983, claiming sexual discrimination, har-
assment, and retaliation.'I Pursuant to these claims, a jury awarded the
plaintiff $3,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages to compensate the plaintiff
for emotional distress and damage to her reputation. 82 After the trial, the
defendant argued that the award was clearly excessive and should be re-
duced. t '3
The court agreed with the defendant, concluding that $300,000 was the
appropriate amount of compensatory damages.' 4 In a final attempt to de-
feat a reduction of the damages, the plaintiff pointed to the AMT trap, argu-
ing that such reduction "would actually result in [the p]laintiff paying her
entire award, plus [some] of her own money (money which she d[id] not
have) to the IRS in income taxes." 8 5 The court acknowledged the possibility
of this result, ' 86 but concluded that it was irrelevant to the issue at hand:
The Court is not unsympathetic to Plaintiffs plight. Plaintiff
waged a courageous fight for what she believed was just... . How-
ever, the Court will not sneak through the back-door of equitable
relief, what the Seventh Circuit, by means of its standards for re-
viewing excessive verdicts, prohibits in the first instance. In this re-
gard, the Court notes that Plaintiff cites absolutely no caselaw au-
thorizing the Court to exercise its equitable powers in the manner
that Plaintiff suggests.
To be sure, the application of the current tax law, as Plaintiff in-
terprets it, appears to produce an anomalous, unjust result. But,...
the perceived inequities of the tax code are simply not at issue
181. Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist., 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
182. Id. at 769. The compensatory portion of the award exceeded the maximum amount
allowable under Title VII, see supra text accompanying notes 10-11, because of the § 1983 claim,
which has no such limit.
183. Spina, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
184. Id. at 776. Based on this conclusion, the court offered a remittitur to the plaintiff, pur-
suant to which she had the choice to either accept the $300,000 award or retry the issue of
damages alone. Id.




here. Congress, not this Court, must correct any shortcomings in the tax
code's application.
... With little more than general legal principles and rhetoric on
Plaintiffs side.... the Court declines Plaintiff's invitation to ven-
ture down a slippery slope and wade into this legal morass under
the guise of equitable relief.1
7
The Spina decision is not directly on point because the plaintiff never
requested a gross up for adverse tax consequences; rather she used the AMT
trap as a defense to the claim that her award was excessive. Perhaps the
court might have been more receptive to a limited gross up claim since the
$2,700,000 excessive portion of the award would clearly have overcompen-
sated the plaintiff,188 particularly if the plaintiff backed up such a claim by
cites to the Sears and O'Neill decisions. However, the italicized language
above suggests otherwise, clearly asserting the view that the plaintiffs tax
problems are strictly a matter between her and Congress.
III. PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR GROSS UPS
This Part describes and analyzes the arguments that discrimination
plaintiffs would make in their attempt to shift the burden of adverse tax con-
sequences from themselves to the defendants. These arguments are based
on the notion that Tide VII, the ADEA, and the ADA provide courts with
broad equitable powers to remedy violations and to make victims of dis-
crimination whole. As previously discussed, some recent decisions provide
support for the position that this grant of remedial powers may include the
ability to gross up a plaintiffs award to neutralize adverse tax conse-
quences.18 9 This Part considers the merits of this position, examining the
text of the remedial provisions of federal anti-discrimination statutes, perti-
nent legislative history, and judicial decisions interpreting these provisions.
The three principal federal anti-discrimination statutes, namely Title
VII, 190 the ADEA,191 and the ADA,l 92 employ two different remedial formulas.
Congress, in enacting Title VII in 1964, borrowed the remedial model em-
bodied in the National Labor Relations Act.1 93 This scheme, in turn, was in-
187. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
188. The court determined that $300,000 was the appropriate award. Thus, the amount of
adverse tax consequences would be determined based on that amount.
189. See supra notes 141-54, 159-80 and accompanying text (discussing cases that support
gross ups for bunching).
190. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2000).
191. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
192. ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
193. See 110 CONG. REc. 7,214 (1964) (interpretive memorandum by Sens. Clark and Case);
i& at 6,549 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) provides, "[W]here an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be
required of the employee or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the dis-
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corporated by reference in the ADA when that statute was enacted in
1990.194 The remedial approach of the ADEA, adopted in 1967, was bor-
rowed instead from the Fair Labor Standards Act.195 While these provisions
differ in language and origin, they nonetheless share a commonality in sub-
stance and in purpose."36
The original remedial provision of Title VII, § 7 06(g), authorized courts
to enjoin discriminatory practices and "order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay."'n Congress significantly ex-
panded this grant of authority in its 1972 amendments to Title VII by adding
the phrase "or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. '
More recently, Congress amended Tide VII in 1991 to provide for compen-
satory and punitive damage awards in cases of intentional discrimination.' 9
The 1991 Civil Rights Act defines compensatory damages to include "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," 200 but not back pay
crimination suffered by him." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). In contrast to the NLRA, which is enforced
through administrative proceedings initiated by the National Labor Relations Board's general
counsel, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160, 161, Congress authorized private lawsuits under Title VII follow-
ing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§
705-708, 78 Stat. 241, 258-62. See generally Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs:
Rethinking the Title VI1 Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1316-20 (1990) (describing Title
VII as embodying a private model of enforcement in contrast to the NLRA's public model of
regulation).
194. The ADA states:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706, 707, 709, and
710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-4 , 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, &
2000e-9) shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this title provides to the
Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this Act, or regulations prom-
ulgated under section 106, concerning employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12117.
195. Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), expressly incorporates the remedial
provisions of the FLSA, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. Section 7(b) states, "the provisions of
this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures pro-
vided in section 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and § 217 of this title, and sub-
section (c) of this section." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
196. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (stating that
"[t]he ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a common purpose:
'the elimination of discrimination in the workplace'" (quoting Oscar Meyers & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 756 (1979))).
197. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259-61.
198. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103,
104-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(g) (2000)),
199. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The 1991 amendments
also provided for a right to a jury trial in cases in where a plaintiff seeks compensatory or puni-
tive damages. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(c)).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3).
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or other types of relief authorized under § 706(g). 0'' The 1991 amendments
place a cap on the total amount of compensatory and punitive damages that
a court may award. The cap varies depending upon the size of the offending
202
employer.
The ADEA's remedial provision has remained unchanged since its
adoption in 1967. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that courts "shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of this Chapter, including without limitation judg-• ,203
ments compelling employment, reinstatement, or promoion. While the
ADEA does not provide expressly for compensatory and punitive damages, it
does authorize the doubling of back pay in the form of "liquidated damages"
in the event of a willful violation.20 4
Although these two formulas are not identical, courts frequently view
the case law with respect to remedies as interchangeable under these statu-
tory schemes since both "'vest trial courts with a similar broad discretion in
awarding such legal or equitable relief as the courts deem appropriate. 205
Significantly, the same administrative agency, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC"), is charged with enforcing each of these
statutes, and the EEOC utilizes the same policy statement on remedies
207
with respect to cases arising under each statute. All three statutes also pro-
vide for a grant of attorney fees to the prevailing party as a means to encour-
age private enforcement of their respective anti-discrimination mandates.
2 08
A. THE MAKE-WHOLE OBJECfVE
The most important shared characteristic of these statutes, at least for
our purposes, is their overarching objective to make whole the victims of
employment discrimination. The pertinent legislative history and judicial
construction underscore that these statutes confer broad discretion on
courts to fashion equitable remedies in order to restore workers injured by
201. Id.§ 1981A(b)(2).
202. Id. § 1981A(b) (3). The damage caps range from a low of $50,000 for an employer with
between 15 and 100 employees to a high of $300,000 for an employer with more than 500 em-
ployees. Id.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
204. Id. (incorporating §§ 16 and 17 of the FLSA, which authorize an award of liquidated
damages).
205. McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1369 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sy-
vock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981)).
206. See Grebeldinger, supra note 16, at 325 (noting that the EEOC is charged with enforc-
ing Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA).
207. Policy Statement on Remedies and Relief for Individual Cases of Unlawful Discrimina-
tion, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1613, app. A (1995).
208. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (incorporating § 16 of the FLSA, which authorizes an award
of attorney fees); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (2000); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000) (adopt-
ing the remedies and enforcement procedures of Title VII).
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civil rights violations to the economic position they would have occupied but
for the unlawful discrimination.0 9
The 1972 amendments to Title VII provide the most meaningful legisla-
tive history. As noted above, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
expanded the arsenal of remedies enabled by Title VII to go beyond the
original authorization of injunctive relief and back pay to also encompass
"any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 20 This language
was added by amendment on the Senate floor,21' with a subsequent Confer-
ence Committee Report providing the only relevant contemporaneous ex-
planation. This report states:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts
wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the
most complete relief possible. In dealing with the present section
7 06(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of relief under that
section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful dis-
crimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests
not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employ-
ment practice complained of, but also requires that persons ag-
grieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employ-
ment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where
212they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
In short, Congress intended the "any other equitable relief' language as a
broad grant of discretion to the courts to fashion such make whole relief as
might be appropriate under the circumstances.
The Supreme Court warmly embraced this notion in Albemarle Paper Co.
213
v. Moody. In that case, a southern paper mill had eliminated its segregated
job classes following the enactment of Tide VII, but placed black workers at
the end of the seniority line which had the effect of disqualifying them for
most higher-paying skilled positions.214 The trial court ruled that the em-
ployer had acted unlawfully and ordered the implementation of a system of
plant-wide seniority, but declined to award back pay to the plaintiff class on
the ground that the employer had not taken its actions in bad faith. 215 The
Supreme Court, after reviewing the pertinent legislative history, disagreed
209. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text (discussing the ADEA's remedial struc-
ture).
210. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104-107 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
211. See supra note 199 (discussing this amendment).
212. 118 CONG. Rxc. 7,168 (1972).
213. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).




and created a presumption in favor of back-pay awards. 16 The Court
grounded this presumption in what it viewed as the twin objectives of Title
VII. One of these objectives, the Court noted, is to deter discrimination and
achieve "equality of employment opportunities. The second objective is
"to make persons whole for injuries" resulting from unlawful discrimina-
tion.2 8 This latter objective, the Court observed, is demonstrated by the fact
that Congress empowered the courts with "full equitable powers" to provide
restorative justice. 2' 9 The Court, accordingly, concluded that "backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination."220
The Supreme Court has found that the ADEA embodies a similar set of
objectives. That statute, similar to the post-19 7 2 version of Title VII, author-
izes courts to grant "such legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.' 22 1 In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co.,2 2 2 the Supreme Court stated that the ADEA and Title VII share in
common the goals of deterrence and compensation. The McKennon Court
went on to explain that the purpose of the compensation goal is "to restore
the employee to the position he or she would have been in absent the dis-
crimination."2 3
Thus, under both statutory schemes, Congress sought to establish a re-
gime in which courts would be vested with broad discretion to redress the
economic injuries flowing from illegal discrimination. 224 It is important to
recognize that this grant of authority is not limited to awarding only the
back-pay and reinstatement relief specifically mentioned in the two statutes.
A great number of decisions demonstrate that these powers encompass
other equitable remedies that, while not expressly listed, nonetheless are
appropriate and necessary in order to make a successful plaintiff whole.
The non-listed equitable remedy most commonly invoked by the courts
is that of front pay. Front pay is an equitable post-judgment remedy in the
form of pay for a predictable period of unemployment or under-
216. Id. at 417-21.
217. Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)).
218. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 421.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
222. 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995).
223. Id. at 362.
224. See, e.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 97 F.3d 833, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing the court's wide discretion to award front-pay damages under Title VII); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin
Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (same).
90 IOWA LA WREVIEW [2004]
employment going into the future 2 " Courts tend to award front pay when
reinstatement to the appropriate position is not possible either because no
vacancy currently exists, 226 or because hostility between the parties makes re-
instatement unfeasible.2 2 7 The Supreme Court, in Pollard v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 22 endorsed front pay under these circumstances as an ap-
propriate component of make-whole relief. The Court in Pollard further
ruled that the authority of a court to award front pay flows from § 706(a)
rather than the 1991 amendments to Title VII and as such, is not subject to
the damage caps applicable to compensatory and punitive relief.
2 2 9
Front pay, however, is only one of a host of equitable adjustments that
courts use to provide full make-whole relief in employment discrimination
suits. Other examples of monetary relief that courts award under Title VII
and the ADEA include such items as lost overtime pay,230 fringe benefits, 2 '
232 233bonuses, the cost of replacement insurance , and the cost of travel and
moving expenses for interim employment. 214 Equitable relief also can take a
non-monetary form such as an affirmative grant of seniority 23 or a promo-
tion to a new position.
In addition, courts increasingly have become aware of the need to fine-
tune a pecuniary award in order to accomplish the make-whole objective.
This is particularly true with respect to adjustments needed to account for
the time value of money. Most courts now adjust the amount of back-pay and
front-pay awards in order to reflect the current value of such awards. Courts
225. Grebeldinger, supra note 16, at 327-28.
226. See, e.g., Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998) (awarding front
pay because the division in which the plaintiff worked was eliminated during a merger); Briseno
v. Cent. Tech. Cmty. Coll. Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1984) (allowing the lower court to
award front pay if it finds that no comparable vacancy exists to that which the plaintiff would
have received if no discrimination occurred).
227. See, e.g., Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1991) (ordering rein-
statement instead of front pay because of the absence of hostility between the parties); Brooks v.
Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 1988) (awarding front pay be-
cause the hostility between the parties was great enough to discourage reinstatement).
228. 532 U.S. 843, 853 (2001).
229. Id. at 854.
230. E.g., United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998); Kossman v.
Calumet County, 800 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1986).
231. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 371, 375-76 (2d Cir. 2000) (including
value of lost pension benefits); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir.
1986) (including value of lost vacation, sick pay, pension benefits, and shift differentials in pay
award).
232. E.g., Sinclair v. Auto. Club, 733 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Domino's
Pizza, 909 F. Supp. 1529, 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
233. E.g., Farriss v. Lynchburg Foundary, 769 F.2d 958, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1985).
234. E.g,, Williams v. Albemarle Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1974).
235. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 765 (1976).
236. E.g.,Jepsen v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 754 F.2d 924, 926-27 (11 th Cir. 1985); Hayes v. Sha-
lala, 933 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
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add, pursuant to their equitable powers, pre-judgment interest on back-pay
amounts to make up for the fact that the plaintiff did not enjoy the use of
such funds at the time when the plaintiff would have earned them but for
the unlawful discrimination.237 Similarly, courts routinely discount the
amount of front-pay awards to reflect the current value of compensation that
would be due and owing in the future.2 8
This was not always the case. An award of pre-judgment interest, for ex-
ample, is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and a number of deci-
sions, particularly those in the earlier days of Title VII, declined to make
such an award. '39 Over time, however, courts have come to view pre-
judgment interest as a necessary component in structuring make-whole re-
lief. Courts now generally presume that pre-judgrnent interest should be
added to back-pay awards. 40 Many reviewing courts find that it is "ordinarily
an abuse of discretion" for the trial court not to include pre-judgment inter-
est in a back-pay award. 4' Under such an approach, courts will award pre-
judgment interest in the absence of exceptional or unusual circumstances. 
2 4 2
A tax gross up fits comfortably within the make-whole objective of fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes. As the O'Neill court stated, "[i]t's not how
much you make, it is how much you keep."243 In light of the bunching prob-
lem and the AMT trap, many successful employment discrimination plain-
tiffs will be made whole only if the courts award tax gross ups.
The time value calculations used by courts in awarding pre-judgment in-
terest and in discounting front-pay amounts provide a useful analogy.24 4 At
first glance, a straightforward award of lost earnings might appear to be the
appropriate touchstone for calculating pecuniary damages in an employ-
ment discrimination suit. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear
that time value adjustments more accurately place a plaintiff in the eco-
nomic position he or she would have occupied in the absence of discrimina-
tion. The same is true with respect to a tax gross up. Because of adverse tax
237. See, e.g., Frazier v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc._ 200 F.3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 2000)
(awarding pre-judgment interest); EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (6th
Cir. 1996) (same). Courts also award post-judgment interest in appropriate circumstances. E.g.,
Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1999).
238. E.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 622 (5th Cir. 1996); Cassino v.
Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987).
239. See, e.g., Hannan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802, 805 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(declining to award pre-judgment interest); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332,
366 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (same).
240. E.g., Ky. State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d at 1098.
241. E.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo, 214 F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2000); Ky. State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d at
1098.
242. Frazier, 200 F.3d at 1194; Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1103 (3d
Cir. 1995).
243. O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
244. However, as discussed infta note 250, defendants would argue that time value of
money adjustments are distinguishable from tax gross ups.
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consequences, a plaintiffs pecuniary damage award leaves him with fewer
after-tax dollars than if no discrimination had taken place. As a result, true
make-whole relief can be accomplished only by taking into account these tax
consequences. Courts that are now "inflation-aware" should also become
.tax-aware." In short, the computation of make-whole relief should not stop
with calculating what plaintiffs receive in pre-tax damages, but should go
further to consider what the tax code allows them to keep.
B. THE DETERRENCE OBJECTIVE
Tax gross ups also would further the other objective underlying the re-
medial provisions of federal anti-discrimination statutes-deterring dis-
crimination in the workplace. The Supreme Court in Albemarle expressly
noted that the deterrence of discrimination is a prime objective of Title VII's
remedial scheme.245 The Court subsequently echoed this deterrence objec-
tive in McKennon with respect to the ADEA.246 By serving as an incentive to
employees to vindicate the anti-discrimination goals of these statutes
through private litigation, these remedial provisions, along with the attor-
ney-fee-shifting provisions, deter discrimination.2 47 In other words, federal
anti-discrimination statutes impose meaningful remedies in part to encour-
age meritorious litigation that will root out and deter discrimination in the
workplace.
Without a tax gross up, the adverse tax consequences described in this
Article reduce this incentive and its resultant deterrent effect by reducing
the ultimate fruits of a successful discrimination lawsuit.248 This is particu-
larly true with respect to adverse tax consequences caused by the AMT trap,
since these consequences can easily consume most or all of a plaintiffs pre-
tax recovery and, in certain extreme instances, can even result in an after-tax
loss.249 Accordingly, a tax gross up, which ensures that the plaintiff receives
the full benefit of his pecuniary damages, furthers this deterrent objective.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST GROSS UPS
As Part III discussed, the plaintiff's argument primarily focuses on the
broad make-whole purpose of the anti-discrimination statutes. It is a truism
that in cases where the plaintiff suffers adverse tax consequences with re-
spect to pecuniary damages, the plaintiff is economically worse off than she
would have been had no discrimination taken place unless the plaintiff re-
245. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
246. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
247. Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1076-78.
248. Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Mechanists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 55 P.3d 1208,
1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the AMT trap "threatens to thwart meritorious suits");
Sager & Cohen, supra note 6, at 1104 (concluding that the "overtaxation of plaintiff's taxable
income [resulting from the AMT trap] discourages the pursuit of civil rights claims"),
249. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the impact of the AMT trap).
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ceives a gross up award. Nevertheless, a defendant has several compelling
arguments against such a gross up. We develop these arguments below.
A. No TAX SHIFING UNLESS SPECIRCALLYAUTHOPzED
The question of whether federal law authorizes gross ups is at its heart
an issue of statutory interpretation. In particular, the resolution of the issue
depends on which of two congressional directives takes precedence. On the
one hand, Congress imposes through the Code the obligation of the plain-
tiff to pay a specified amount of taxes on his income, which includes an
award of pecuniary damages.2 50 On the other hand, Congress imposes
through the anti-discrimination laws the obligation of defendants to pay
successful plaintiffs an amount of money to put the plaintiffs in the same
economic position they would have occupied had no discrimination oc-
curred.2 5'
The question then is which congressional directive (for the plaintiff to
pay his own taxes or for the defendant to make the plaintiff economically
whole) controls. The answer is not apparent based on the text of the stat-
utes,252 though the case law supporting gross ups simply assume without dis-
cussion that the "make-whole directive" trumps the "pay-your-taxes direc-
tive."255 Defendants, however, would argue otherwise.
In support of this argument defendants would cite the canon of statu-
tory interpretation that "'where there is no clear intention otherwise, a spe-
cific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.' 254 The de-
fendants' argument using this canon goes as follows. The statutes that
impose a tax on plaintiff are specific in that they obligate the plaintiff (and
only the plaintiff) to pay a precise dollar amount in tax. On the other hand,
the anti-discrimination remedial statutes are general in that they obligate
the defendant to make the plaintiff whole. If a court did award a gross up to
the plaintiff, a portion of the plaintiff's tax burden would be shifted so that
250. See I.R.C. § 1 (2000) (imposing regular tax liability on taxpayer); id. § 55 (imposing
alternative minimum tax liability on taxpayer). Defendants would argue that the source of ad-
verse tax consequences (i.e., congressional action) sufficiently distinguishes tax gross ups, which
they would argue should not be allowed, from time value of money adjustments, which are
clearly allowed. While the time value of money results from economic forces, the burden caused
by adverse tax consequences results solely from prior congressional action. While this distinc-
tion is certainly true, it should not be determinative on the gross up issue because, as we explain
in this Part IV.A, Congress's make-whole directive should prevail as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation.
251. See supra Part III.A (discussing the make-whole objective).
252. The tax statutes and the anti-discrimination statutes provide no guidance as to how
they interact.
253. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(awarding tax gross up for bunching without discussing the conflict between these two congres-
sional directives).
254. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (quoting
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
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the incidence of such portion would fall upon defendant rather than plain-
tiff. In such a case, the specific taxing statutes would be nullified in part by a
general statute because, instead of the plaintiff-taxpayer paying the full
amount of taxes imposed by the Code, the defendant would pay some por-
tion of those taxes. If Congress wanted to impose an extra tax on defendants
responsible for unlawful discrimination, then Congress would have either
(a) explicitly taxed defendants directly, or (b) made clear its intention that
the general anti-discrimination remedies shifted part of plaintiffs tax bur-
den to the defendant.
255
This argument fails for two reasons. First, in a practical sense, it is the
anti-discrimination statutes rather than the tax code that provide the more
specific set of rules applicable in this context. The anti-discrimination rules
expressly regulate workplace behavior and provide for make-whole relief
when employers violate those rules. The tax rules, in contrast, apply to all
taxpayers without any specific reference to the workplace or to employment
discrimination. The tax rules that create the bunching problem and the
AMT trap do not by their terms target employment discrimination plaintiffs;
it just so happens that employment discrimination plaintiffs are the taxpay-
256ers who are usually most adversely affected by these rules. Since the make-
whole principles embodied in federal anti-discrimination statutes more di-
rectly speak to the amount of money remaining in a discrimination plain-
tiffs pocket at the end of the day than does the tax code, that set of rules
should be given precedence in this setting.
Second, the make-whole directive should prevail because such a result is
more consistent with congressional intent. One must remember that statu-
tory canons of construction are merely inferences of legislative intent.
25 7
Though one can infer that Congress generally would prefer that a specific
statute trump a more general statute, such an inference should not be ap-
plied blindly. In this case, we believe that even if the anti-discrimination re-
medial provisions are deemed to be the more general rules, they should
trump the tax rules.
A thought experiment might be helpful to illustrate this point. Imagine
that Congress decides that discrimination recoveries represent windfalls or
that it wants to reduce the frequency of employment discrimination litiga-
tion. To remedy the situation, Congress imposes an excise tax of ten percent
on all discrimination recoveries. In such a case, it is clear that a gross up
pursuant to the make whole directive would not be appropriate because it
255. Cf McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp., 127 A.2d 269, 273 (N.H. 1956) (concluding
that a tax gross up for adverse tax consequences caused by bunching was not appropriate be-
cause the plaintiff's "remedy [for excessive taxation on bunched income] should be sought at
the source-in federal legislation").
256. See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the source of the AMT trap).




would be shifting a liability that Congress clearly intended that plaintiffs,
and not defendants, pay. If Congress wanted defendants to pay the excise
tax, then Congress would have imposed the excise tax directly on defen-
dants.
Defendants would argue that the adverse tax consequences caused by
bunching and the AMT trap are effectively such an excise tax on plaintiffs
that cannot be shifted without specific authority to do so. The retort to this
argument is obvious. While the excise tax in the thought experiment was
based on a substantive policy decision to excessively tax discrimination plain-
tiffs, the adverse tax consequences described in this Article lack such a sub-
stantive foundation.
As previously discussed, the bunching problem arises from having pro-
gressive tax rates combined with annual accounting. 258 Arguably, the repeal
of income averaging could be interpreted as a congressional directive to re-
quire recipients of bunched income to pay a greater amount of tax than if
the income was earned over time. However, the repeal of income averaging
is best seen as a mere simplification measure, not as a decision that bunched
income, as a matter of substantive policy, should be taxed at a greater rate.
In other words, getting the fight conceptual answer in the huge number of
*259instances 5 in which a taxpayer receives bunched income was determined to
be simply not worth the administrative inconvenience. 26 Therefore, unlike
in the case of the hypothetical excise tax, the adverse tax consequences
caused by bunching are not the product of a substantive policy choice to ex-
cessively tax certain employment discrimination plaintiffs. As result, Con-
gress's repeal of income averaging should not be understood to foreclose
the courts' ability to award gross ups for bunching, a remedy based on Con-
gress's make-whole directive, which was clearly the product of a substantive
policy decision.
While Congress's repeal of income averaging suggests that the bunch-
ing problem might have been contemplated, it is obvious that the AMT trap
was an unforeseen and unintended consequence of the 1996 legislation that
258. See supra Part LA (discussing the bunching problem).
259. The bunching problem is not unique to employment discrimination recoveries. In all
instances in which a taxpayer receives compensation attributable to two or more taxable years
in a single taxable year, the taxpayer has received bunched income which may be taxed at inap-
propriately high tates. Thus, for example, the receipt of a bonus for work performed in two or
more years is a common example of bunched income.
260. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing repealed income-averaging
provisions). The administrative problem is relevant to the gross up issue. As we discuss infra Part
IV.C.3, the fact that a court has the authority to provide a gross up to neutralize adverse tax
consequences does not necessarily mean that a court should always use this authority whenever
these consequences arise. Rather, the court should balance the administrative difficulty in
computing gross ups against the amount of the probable adverse tax consequences. In this re-
gard, the court has the advantage of making a case-by-case, after-the-fact administrative diffi-
culty analysis, unlike the Code, which must provide global rules ex ante.
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required non-physical personal injury recoveries to be included in gross in-
come. 261 The AMT trap is a mistake, a statutory flaw, with no policy justifica-
262tion (not even simplicity) to support its presence.
It is clear then that the adverse tax consequences described in this Arti-
cle were not the product of a deliberate choice to excessively tax discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. In contrast, the anti-discrimination remedial provisions are
the product of explicit and reasoned decisions to put discrimination victims
in the same economic position that they would have occupied but for the
discrimination and to provide incentives for employees to vindicate anti-
263discrimination goals through private litigation. Thus, these provisions re-
flect a deliberate congressional choice supported by clear substantive policy
justifications. The federal anti-discrimination statutes, accordingly, should
prevail in this context regardless of whether they are viewed as the more
general or the more specific set of rules because, under either view, such a
result will be most consistent with congressional intent.
B. COURTS AWARo PRE-TAx, NOT A ER-TAX DOLLARS
To support its position that the plaintiffs tax consequences should not
be considered by courts, defendants might point to the general rule that ju-
ries and judges award damages in the form of pre-tax dollars.264 This rule,
which defendants might argue is analogous to the "American rule" that par-
265ties are generally responsible for their own attorney's fees, provides that
plaintiffs are responsible for their own taxes. Just as a plaintiffs attorney's
fees are generally a matter between the plaintiff and her attorney, a plain-
tiffs taxes are a matter between her and the taxing authority. Under this
view, a court awards pre-tax dollars and lets the tax "chips" fall where they266
may. Defendants would argue that Congress, in enacting the anti-
261. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the AMT's unintended con-
sequences for discrimination plaintiffs).
262. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing how the AMT trap violates
tax policy).
263. See supra Part IILA (discussing the make-whole objective).
264. See Estate ofSpinosa v. Int'l Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154, 1158 (lst Cir. 1980) (assert-
ing that "a mountain of... state [law] authority" exists supporting the view that courts should
not consider the impact of taxes on recoveries); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 151
Cal. Rptr. 399, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1978) (recognizing and following the majority rule hold-
ing "that income tax consequences are of no relevance in personal injury litigation").
265. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (describing
the American rule that, unless a statute provides otherwise, each party is responsible for his own
attorney's fees).
266. This view appears closely related to the argument that the "proximate cause" of ad-
verse tax consequences is the tax laws giving rise to the adverse tax consequences rather than
the defendant's unlawful conduct. See McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp., 127 A.2d 269, 272-
73 (N.H. 1956) (refusing, in a breach of contract case, to augment damages to neutralize ad-
verse tax consequences caused by bunching because the "situation results primarily from the
provisions of the federal income tax statute which sometimes produces inequities" and because
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discrimination remedial provisions, legislated against this backdrop rule
and, accordingly, any deviation from this rule would require specific au-
thorization.
In support of this argument, defendants could cite to § 914A of the very
influential Second Restatement of Torts, which provides that in general the
tax consequences of a tort recovery are immaterial in determining the
amount of the recovery. 267 This rule requires courts to ignore the effect of
taxes even in instances in which a tax-free recovery represents future wages
that would have been fully taxed if earned in due course.2u In other words,
the Restatement provides that even if the recovery would be tax-free, pre-tax
earnings (rather than after-tax earnings) should generally form the basis for
269the recovery.
Although the Restatement's "tax-blind" rule may represent the majority
view, that view is by no means universal. '70 In fact, the Supreme Court re-
jected that view in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, a 1980 case involv-
ing the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").'71 In that case, the estate
of a fireman who died as the result of the defendant's negligence sued the
defendant under FELA, which entitled the estate to a recovery of "the dam-
ages ... [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the
,,212beneficiaries might have reasonably received. The estate argued that the
Court should use the fireman's hypothetical future gross earnings in calculat-
ing this recovery, while the defendant argued that only after-tax earnings
should be used.273
The Court agreed with the defendant, concluding that after-tax earn-
ings are to be used under FELA:
The amount of money that a wage earner is able to contribute to
the support of his family is unquestionably affected by the amount
of the tax he must pay to the Federal Government. It is his after-tax
income, rather than his gross income before taxes, that provides
the only realistic measure of his ability to support his family. It fol-
the "remedy should be sought at the source-in federal legislation"); see also Blaney v. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 55 P.3d 1208, 1217-18 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) (explaining and rejecting defendant's proximate cause argument against tax gross ups).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS§ 914A (1979).
268. Id. cmt. b.
269. There are two justifications for § 914A's focus on pre-tax dollars. First, in cases in
which the award is tax-free, using after-tax wages would shift a tax benefit intended for plaintiffs
to defendants. Second, using after-tax dollars to compute an award could be complex, possibly
involving a great deal of speculation. Id.
270. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in
FixingDamages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 589 (1982) (citing cases that both
follow and refuse to follow the "tax-blind" rule).
271. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 491 (1980).
272. Id. at 491-93.
273. Id.
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lows inexorably that, the wage earner's income tax is a relevant fac-
tor in calculating the monetary loss suffered by his dependents
when he dies. 74
Though Liepelt did not involve federal anti-discrimination statutes, it is
problematic for the defendant with respect to its argument that courts are to
award pre-tax dollars, leaving the plaintiff to deal with his own tax conse-
quences. The Court, recognizing that from an economic perspective only
after-tax dollars are meaningful, interpreted FELA to provide a recovery that
takes into account tax consequences. Lower federal courts have extended
Liepelt's "tax-aware" rule to other federal causes of actions that include
275
claims for lost earnings.
The defendant might attempt to distinguish the Liepelt case by noting
that, in that case, the hypothetical future wages would have been taxable,
while the FELA recovery was tax-free under the Code.276 This wholly incon-
sistent tax treatment is not present with respect to anti-discrimination pecu-
niary awards because both the award and the wages it represents are tax-
able. 7 This distinction, however, is not meaningful because although both
the awards and the wages are taxable, they are simply not taxed equivalently.
This lack of equivalence gives rise to the adverse tax consequences described
in this Article. Liepelt stands for the proposition that, at least under FELA's
broad remedial provisions, only after-tax dollars are important. Thus, Liepelt
appears to support a similar conclusion under the broad anti-discrimination
remedial provisions. At the very least, Liepelt and its progeny are evidence
that the Restatement's tax-blind rule does not reflect a consensus view that
would have provided a clear backdrop rule to the anti-discrimination reme-
dial provisions.
274. Id. at 493-94.
275. See, e.g., Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the
tax-aware rule in computing damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Davis v. Little, 851
F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying tax-aware rule in computing damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that a rule that
"ftcus[es] upon after-tax earnings is an exercise in economic fairness" and extending the rule
"at least to all federal law claims for future lost wages"). In addition, though Liepelt itself in-
volved a wrongful death claim, lower federal courts have applied the tax-aware rule to federal
personal injury claims not involving wrongful death. See Paquette v. Atlanska-Plovidba, 701 F.2d
746, 748 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that the tax-aware rule also "appl[ies] to lost future earnings
for one who is injured but not killed in an accident"); Fanetti, 678 F.2d at 430 (applying rule to
claim not involving wrongful death under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act).
276. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 500-02 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
277. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the taxation of discrimina-
tion awards).
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C. COMPLEXIT AND SPECULATION
A defendant might also argue that even if the court would otherwise
permit tax gross ups, determining the amount of adverse tax consequences
would involve an undue amount of complexity and speculation.278 We ad-
dress this issue below.
1. Bunching
In computing the amount of adverse tax consequences caused by
bunching, one needs to determine two separate tax rates: (1) the tax rates
that would have been applied to the hypothetical wages had they been
earned in due course, and (2) the tax rates that will be applied to the lump-
sum recovery. In determining these tax rates, one needs to know the amount
of taxable income the taxpayer earned (or would in the future earn) in the
year in question, as well as the § 1 tax rates for such year.
Determining the tax rates applicable to the lump-sum recovery is
straightforward, as it would be easy to determine the plaintiffs income (be-
fore taking into account the award) and the applicable tax rates in the year
of the recovery. Likewise, to the extent that the award represents a loss of
back pay, determining the tax rates that would have applied to the back pay
is straightforward since it would be easy to determine the plaintiffs income
and applicable tax rates for years in the past.279 However, to the extent the
award represents a loss of future earnings, determining the tax rates that
would have applied to these hypothetical future wages involves some specu-
lation and, as a result, additional complexity.
2 0
In determining the tax rates applicable to this hypothetical front pay,
one would need to know what the plaintiff's gross income and deductions
278. See Paris v. Remington Rand, Inc., 101 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1939) (refusing to augment
damages for adverse tax consequences caused by bunching in a breach of contract case because
"[t]o calculate such an item of damages permits of wide speculation"); DePalma v. Westland
Software House, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1534, 1544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting defendant's arg-u-
ment that plaintiffs damages should be reduced by tax benefits received in a breach of contract
case in part because of "the necessarily complex and speculative nature of inquiring into tax
consequences"). One might also object to gross ups on the basis that they would be extremely
costly to employers because, as described in note 34 supra, the gross ups themselves are taxable,
requiring a further gross up, which itself would be taxable, requiring a further gross up, and so
on. For example, assuming that the amount of adverse tax consequences suffered by a plaintiff
equals $300,000 and the tax rate applicable to the gross up is 35%, ajudge would have to order
a gross up equal to $461,538, which would be deductible by the defendant, in order to neutral-
ize the adverse tax consequences. It may seem, at first glance, unduly expensive to charge the
defendant with a $461,538 gross up in order to "solve" a $300,000 tax problem. However, absent
a gross up and assuming a constant tax rate of 35%, the plaintiff would have to earn $461,538 of
pre-tax earnings himself in order to absorb the adverse tax consequences. Therefore, someone,
either the plaintiff or the defendant, will have to come up with $461,538 of pre-tax dollars to
satisfy the excess tax liability---ordering a gross up would put that burden on the defendant.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 914A cmt. c (1979).
280. Id. cmrt. b.
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would be in the future years to which the front pay relates. 281 Gross income
would include not only the plaintiffs estimated future wages, but if the
plaintiff is or will be married, the plaintiffs spouse's future wages. Gross in-
come would also include any future passive income, such as dividends from
stocks. Possible deductions would include dependency deductions for the
plaintiffs children, as well as deductions for home mortgage interest and
state and local taxes.
In addition to speculating about the plaintiffs future tax circumstances,
one would also have to speculate about future tax law. 18 Tax laws change
frequently, especially the tax rates set forth in § 1.183 In addition to rate
changes, there may be substantive changes to the tax law that affect the tax-
payer's tax liability.
Despite this conjecture, it seems to us that the amount of speculation
involved in computing adverse tax consequences caused by the bunching of
future income is no greater than the amount of speculation typically in-
volved in computing pecuniary damages under anti-discrimination stat-
utes. 284 In computing these damages, courts may need to consider a number
of variables, such as the amount of back-pay or front-pay loss, the age at
285
which the plaintiff would retire, and future inflation. All of these variables
involve inexact speculation about the future, yet courts are forced to make a
best guess in order to fashion a remedy that has the greatest chance of mak-
ing plaintiffs perfectly whole.2"6 There is no reason why a court should treat
the variable of future tax consequences any differently.
2. AMT Trap
Determining the amount of adverse tax consequences caused by the
AMT trap presents more difficulty. With respect to a recovery (or portion
thereof) that represents future wages, the complexity and speculation issues
with respect to computation discussed above in Part 1V.C.1 remain relevant.
These issues are not insurmountable. However, because of the uncertain tax
law surrounding the AMT trap, it may be very difficult to determine whether
adverse tax consequences even arise in a given case.
281. Id.; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980).
282. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494.
283. See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41-44 (changing marginal tax rates). For an example of how a court
dealt with the uncertainty regarding future tax rates, see Oddi v. Ayco Corp., 947 F.2d 257, 261-
62 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying a presumption that current tax rates will persist).
284. See Liebelt, 444 U.S. at 494.
285. See id.
286. See id, As we discuss in Part IV.C.3 below, the administrative difficulty in computing
gross ups should not be entirely ignored because in certain cases the benefits of providing a
gross up are outweighed by the administrative burden in computing them.
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The tax law is uncertain because of the upcoming Supreme Court deci-
sion regarding the taxation of contingent fee arrangements. In two consoli-
dated cases, the Supreme Court will decide the issue of whether the inclu-
sion/deduction method or the exclusion method is appropriate. There are
three possible outcomes. First, the Court could determine that the inclu-
sion/deduction method applies in all cases, regardless of underlying state
attorney lien law. 87 Second, the Court could determine that the exclusion
method applies in all cases, regardless of underlying state attorney lien
law. 288 Finally, the Court could determine that the appropriate method is
dependent on underlying state attorney lien law.28 9
Under the first outcome, the AMT trap would apply to all discrimina-
tion plaintiffs, subject only to a retroactive legislative fix. Under the second
outcome, the AMT trap would completely disappear. Only under the third
outcome would there remain any doubt about whether, absent retroactive
legislation, the AMT trap would apply to a particular plaintiff since the ap-
plication would depend on an analysis of state law.
We predict that the first outcome (i.e., that the inclusion/deduction
method applies in all cases) is the most likely and that the third outcome
(i.e., that underlying state law is determinative) is highly unlikely. As several
commentators have explained, the Code appears to clearly require the in-
clusion/deduction method even though it yields the wrong policy result.
290
The current Court, with its emphasis on textualism, 29 will likely agree.
The third outcome is, in our opinion, by far the most unlikely because it
would improperly elevate the formal attributes of state law over substance.
292
As a practical matter, all state attorney lien laws operate in precisely the
287. See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001) (following the in-
clusion/deduction method); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
288. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (following the exclusion
method); Sriastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
289. See, e.g., Raymond v. Comm'r, 355 F.3d 107, 114-18 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that
the inclusion/deduction method applies after analyzing Vermont attorney lien law); Banaitis v.
Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the exclusion method ap-
plies after analyzing Oregon attorney lien law).
290. See, e.g., Geier, supra note 53, at 549; Timothy R. Koski, Should Clients Escape Tax on
Lawsuit Proceeds Retained by Attorneys?, 92 TAX NOTES 93, 97 (2001); Polsky, supra note 5, at 63;
Lawrence M. Stone et al., High Court Should Deny 'Stealth' AMT Relief in Att'y Fee Cases, 103 TAX
NOTES 1407, 1407 (2004).
291. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 275, 277-78 (1998) (describing the Rehnquist Court's use of textualism).
292. In addition, as a technical tax matter, it is difficult to see how attorney lien law impacts
the tax consequences for the plaintiff. See Polsky, supra note 5, at 95-111 (concluding that, even
if the contingent fee agreement is treated as effecting a transfer of a portion of the claim for tax
purposes, the entire recovery is still included in the plaintiffs gross income).
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same manner. Tax law is concerned with the substance of transactions; as
a result, a plaintiffs tax consequences should not "depend on the intricacies
of an attorney's bundle of rights against the [client]." 24 Furthermore, the
Court would be loathe to affirm a "state-by state approach [which] would
not provide reliable precedent... or provide sufficient notice to taxpayers
as to lthe] tax treatment of contingency-based attorney's fees."2 1 In addi-
tion, such a formalistic approach would likely cause state legislatures to
amend their attorney lien statutes to add the magic, though substantively
meaningless, words in order to achieve the better federal tax results for their
residents, perhaps generating the next round of litigation over whether the
magic words are sufficient."'
For the reasons discussed above, after the Supreme Court speaks on the
issue, it is likely that the AMT trap will apply to all discrimination plaintiffs
wherever situated. If so, absent retroactive legislation fixing the flaw, a judge
will know with certainty that a plaintiff will suffer adverse tax consequences
resulting from the AMT trap and can order a gross up to neutralize these297
consequences.
3. De Minimis Rule
We have argued that courts have the authority, under the anti-
discrimination remedial provisions, to enter a gross up to compensate plain-
293. See Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts relying on
state attorney lien law have reached different conclusions even though there was "no relevant
distinction" between the state law analyzed).
294. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Banks v. Comm'r, 345
F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting distinctions based on state attorney lien law differences
that lack substantive effect); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712 (1962), affd, 319 F.2d 532
(3d Cir. 1963) (same).
295. Banks, 345 F.3d at 385; see also Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir.
2001) (concluding that a "universal standard independent of" formalistic differences in state
attorney lien laws would be desirable).
296. See, e.g., Wash. S.B. 58-6270, 2nd Sess. (2004) (explaining a proposal to amend Wash-
ington's attorney lien statute retroactively for the sole "purpose of making attorney's fees tax-
able solely to the attorney"); cf Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year De-
bate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 515-17 (1995) (describing the proliferation of limited liability
company (LLC) statutes after the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, which announced
that LLCs could be taxed as partnerships even if they operated in all important respects like
closely held corporations).
297. A judge may be concerned, however, that if a retroactive legislative fix is made, the
plaintiff would be left with a windfall since the adverse tax consequences resulting from the
AMT trap would evaporate. For example, § 643 of the JOBS Act, recently passed by the Senate
but not included in the corresponding House bill, would fix the AMT trap and would apply ret-
roactively to all attorney's fees paid after December 31, 2002. This is a difficult problem. A
judge concerned about the windfall could retain jurisdiction over the case during the statute of
limitations applicable to the taxpayer's tax return and order the taxpayer to reimburse the de-




tiffs for adverse tax consequences. However, we believe that courts do not
have the obligation to do so in every case in which adverse tax consequences
are present. Because of the broad discretion given to courts to fashion ap-
propriate make-whole relief, courts can award a tax gross up in situations
where adverse tax consequences are severe, while denying or limiting such
relief when the circumstances are not so compelling.
In making the determination of whether to exercise this authority,
courts should determine the relevant weight of two factors: (1) the amount
of the adverse tax consequences that probably would be suffered by the
plaintiff in the absence of a gross up, versus (2) the difficulty and cost of
computing the precise amount of an appropriate gross up. 299 Because com-
puting the precise amount of adverse tax consequences will never be an easy
exercise, courts may properly decline to order a gross up that is de minimis
either in absolute terms or in relation to the plaintiff's recovery.
This de minimis rule will generally impact cases in which only bunching
concerns are present since the consequences of the AMT trap tend to be
quite severe. Attempting to alleviate a modest bunching problem (e.g., one
that bunches only a few years of wages into a single year) may simply not be
worth the effort.
V. COMPUTING GROSS UPS IN MORE COMPLEX CASES
This Article thus far has considered cases in which only pecuniary dam-
ages (i.e., losses of back pay or front pay) are awarded. In these cases, the
appropriate formula for determining the amount of adverse tax conse-
quences is readily apparent-the excess of (i) a baseline amount equal to
the after-tax dollars the plaintiff would have received had the back pay and
front pay represented by tie award been received in due course, over (ii)
the actual amount of after-tax dollars recovered by the plaintiff. More sim-
ply, the formula is the excess of (i) the amount of after-tax dollars the plain-
tiff would have gotten had he not suffered discrimination, over (ii) the
amount of after-tax dollars the plaintiff actually gets. This formula is appar-
ent because the baseline-the amount of wages the plaintiff would have
been able to keep (after the payment of taxes) had no discrimination oc-
curred-is apparent. In order to fulfill Congress's make-whole directive, the
298. See supra Part I1.A (discussing the make-whole objective).
299. All of the difficulty and cost relate to the problems discussed in Parts IV.C.1 and 2
above regarding the complexity and speculation involved in computing the amount of adverse
tax consequences. Because of this complexity and speculation, the parties would have to ex-
pend time and resources (in particular relating to expert witness testimony) in fashioning their
arguments, and the court would be burdened with assimilating this information and arriving at
a precise gross up figure.
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plaintiff should be compensated for the amount by which an award does not
meet this baseline amount.
3 0 0
However, the relevant baseline is not nearly as apparent when an award
(or portion thereof) represents non-pecuniary damages, such as compensa-
tory damages for emotional distress or punitive damages. Unlike pecuniary
damages, these damages do not represent amounts that would have been
received and taxed had no discrimination occurred.30 ' In amending §
104(a)(2) Congress explicitly decided that these non-pecuniary damages
were to be taxable when such damages are attributable to a non-physical in-
jury; therefore, it seems clear that the baseline tax treatment should include
the taxation of these awards.'0 2 But at what level of taxation?
Defendants would argue that because there is no clear baseline tax
treatment for non-pecuniary damages, a court may augment only the pecu-
niary damage portion of an award to compensate for adverse tax conse-
quences.30 3 After all, how does a court fulfill the make-whole prerogative
with respect to amounts that would not have been paid but for the litiga-
tion?
301
On the other hand, plaintiffs may argue that the baseline amount for
non-pecuniary damages is equal to the highest marginal tax rate to which
plaintiff could be subject. Currently, the highest marginal tax rate is 35%.305
This would appear to be the highest marginal tax rate that Congress could
have contemplated would apply to non-pecuniary awards, but because of the
unforeseen consequences of the AMT trap, marginal rates may in fact be
higher on these awards. Under this method courts would gross up plaintiffs
with respect to non-pecuniary damages in order to ensure that they end up
300. As discussed supra note 34, in addition to awarding this amount, the court, in order to
make plainiff whole, would also need to award an additional amount because the gross up itself
is taxable.
301. See O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (con-
cluding that, because "[t]he compensatory and liquidated damages . . . are only a product of
th[e] lawsuit [and] . . . would not have [been] received ... but for the defendant's discrimina-
tory action," no gross up was appropriate with respect to these damages).
302. Some commentators have argued that, as a tax policy matter, compensatory damages
for emotional distress should be excluded from gross income since these damages result from
an involuntary liquidation of human capital. E.g., Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Dam-
age Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1987); Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory
and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 347-48
(1995). Under this view, one could argue that the appropriate baseline is the gross amount of
these compensatory damages, unreduced by any tax. While this baseline might be appropriate
as a normative matter, using it would disregard the clear congressional directive that these
compensatory damages are taxable when they are not attributable to a physical injury.
303. This method effectively treats the baseline amount of non-pecuniary damages as ex-
acdy equal to the amount of after-tax dollars the plaintiff recovers attributable to such damages,
so that no adverse tax consequences are deemed to result from the receipt of these damages.
304. See O'Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (concluding that a gross up for bunching with re-
spect to compensatory damages would result in a windfall for plaintiffs).
305. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
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with at least 65% of the gross non-pecuniary damage award after payment of
taxes.
It seems to us that defendant's position has greater merit, with one ca-
veat discussed below. Without a clear baseline amount, it is simply impossi-
ble to determine how exactly the plaintiff can be made whole.
The caveat involves the extreme case where the AMT trap causes the
plaintiff to owe more in taxes than the pre-tax recovery. Even if only com-
pensatory and punitive damages are awarded in such a case, a tax gross up
should be awarded to prevent the plaintiff from suffering an after-tax loss as
a result of the discrimination and ensuing successful litigation. For example,
in the Porter case discussed above, the plaintiff received $30,000 in compen-
306
satory and punitive damages, but no pecuniary damages. Due to the
$200,000 attorney's fee award, the plaintiff would likely end up with an after-
tax loss due to the effect of the AMT trap.10 7 In such a case, the make-whole
directive is implicated-the court should ensure that, at the very least, the
plaintiff is not in a worse economic position after the discrimination and en-
suing successful litigation than before. The court can do this by ordering a




To summarize, courts should ordinarily not gross up non-pecuniary
awards because, unlike with respect to pecuniary awards, there is no clear
baseline tax treatment for the components of these awards. As a result, it is
impossible to determine how exactly to make a plaintiff whole. However, in
cases in which the plaintiff will experience an after-tax loss resulting from
her receipt of non-pecuniary damages, courts should provide a gross up to
offset this loss.
CONCLUSION
The overarching purpose of anti-discrimination remedies is to put the
victim of discrimination in the same economic position he would have occu-
pied if no discrimination had occurred. However, absent a tax gross up, the
Code would frustrate this objective by taxing pecuniary awards more heavily
than the lost wages they represent. As a result of these adverse tax conse-
quences, unless courts award tax gross ups, discrimination plaintiffs will not
be made whole.
We have argued that the broad remedial powers granted to courts un-
der the anti-discrimination statutes provide authority for courts to award tax
gross ups, effectively shifting the burden of these adverse tax consequences
306. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing Porter).
307. Porter v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 293 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2003). This assumes
that a reviewing court would apply the inclusion/deduction method, thereby triggering the
AMT trap. See supra text accompanying notes 86-114.
308. As described in note 34 supra, the tax gross up would have to be greater than the
plaintiff's after-tax loss because the tax gross up itself would be taxable.
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from plaintiffs to defendants. Such tax gross ups are necessary to ensure that
successful discrimination plaintiffs are made whole in a meaningful, after-tax
sense.
Shifting the burden of adverse tax consequences to defendants would
also provide an incidental benefit. The AMT trap, the statutory flaw that is
the major cause of adverse tax consequences, persists only because the vic-
tims of the trap--employment discrimination and other civil rights plain-
tiffs-lack sufficient political coordination and muscle to stimulate Congress
to act. Perhaps by shifting the burden of the AMT trap to the more politi-
cally savvy employer-defendants, tax gross ups might finally produce the long
awaited legislative solution.
